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Future Plant Designs Subcommittee

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	+ + + +
6	MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
7	FUTURE PLANT DESIGNS
8	+ + + +
9	FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 2004
10	+ + + +
11	The Subcommittee meeting commenced at 8:30
12	a.m., in Room T-2B3 of the Nuclear Regulatory
13	Commission, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,
14	Dr. Thomas S. Kress, Subcommittee Chairman, presiding.
15	SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
16	THOMAS S. KRESS, Chairman
17	VICTOR H. RANSOM
18	STEPHEN L. ROSEN
19	WILLIAM J. SHACK
20	JOHN D. SIEBER
21	GRAHAM B. WALLIS
22	
23	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
24	GOUTAM BAGCHI
25	STEVEN BLOOM

		2
1	NRC STAFF PRESENT (Continued):	
2	THOMAS CHENG	
3	GANESH CHERU	
4	JOSEPH COLACCINO	
5	DAVID CULLISON	
6	BOB DENNIG	
7	ANDRE DROZO	
8	LAURA DUDES	
9	ROB ELLIOT	
10	BARRY ELLIOTT	
11	MICHELLE HART	
12	MATTHEW A. MITCHELL	
13	LAUREN QUINONES	
14	SELIM SANCAKTAR	
15	JOHN SEGALA	
16	PATRICK SEKERAK	
17	DAVID SOLORIO	
18	DAVID TERAO	
19	JERRY WILSON	
20		
21	ALSO PRESENT:	
22	MIKE BATTAGLIA, Ionics, Inc.	
23	ED CUMMINS, Westinghouse	
24	CESARE FREPOLI, Westinghouse	
25	R.O. GAUNTT, Sandia National Labs	

		3
1	ALSO PRESENT (Continued):	
2	RANDOLPH GOUNDER, Ionics, Inc.	
3	PAIGE NEGRES, GE	
4	JIM SCOBEL, Westinghouse	
5	TERRY SCHULZ, Westinghouse	
6	JOHM TROTLER, Framatome	
7	LEE TUNON-SANJUR, Westinghouse	
8	RON VIJUK, Westinghouse	
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5 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (8:30 a.m.)CHAIRMAN KRESS: This is the meeting of 3 Advisory Committee on 4 the Reactor Safequards, 5 Subcommittee on Future Plant Designs. am Thomas Kress, Chairman of the 6 7 subcommittee. Members in attendance are Jack Sieber, Bill Shack, Steve Rosen, and Graham Wallis. 8 9 MR. SIEBER: And Vic is here. CHAIRMAN KRESS: Vic Ransom is here also. 10 11 Okay. He just arrived. 12 MR. SIEBER: There he is. CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay. The purpose of 13 14 this meeting is to discuss with the NRC staff and 15 Westinghouse representatives the AP1000 safety evaluation report, and the resolution of any open 16 17 items and any ACRS lingering concerns and issues. The subcommittee will gather information, 18 19 analyze relevant issues and facts and formulate proposed positions and actions as appropriate for 20 21 deliberation by the full committee.

The rules for participation in today's

Dr. Medhat El-Zeftawy is the designated

federal official for this meeting.

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1 this meeting previously published in the Federal Register on June 14th, 2004. 2 3 A transcript of the meeting is being kept 4 and will be made available as stated in the Federal Therefore, it is requested that 5 Register notice. speakers identify themselves and use a microphone if 6 7 possible. We have received no written comments or 8 requests for time to make oral statements from any 9 members of the public regarding today's meeting. 10 11 I don't have any particular preliminary 12 comments except to say that this is probably the culmination meeting of a long series of ACRS meetings 13 14 with Westinghouse and the staff on this subject. 15 I'll turn the with that, floor over to the Westinghouse people to get started. 16 17 MR. VIJUK: And I'm Ron Vijuk. I manage the licensing for AP1000 in Westinghouse, and we 18 19 wanted to start today with an overview of the design 20 and some of the analysis that backs it up just as a 21 refresher, if you will, and Terry Schulz will make 22 that presentation. 23 MR. SCHULZ: Good morning. As Ron said, 24 my name is Terry Schulz, and I hope to just throw some

information up here for your consideration.

1 probably seen it all before, but it will put us all on 2 the same page. 3 CHAIRMAN KRESS: It never hurts to refresh 4 the memory of the ACRS. 5 (Laughter.) I didn't want to say too 6 MR. SCHULZ: 7 much. 8 DR. WALLIS: Is this an eye test on the bottom right-hand side there? 9 10 MR. SCHULZ: No, you don't have to read 11 that. This is a visual thing here, sort of 12 impression. AP1000 is built on a huge investment that 13 14 Westinghouse and our partners made in AP600 15 technology, developing designing and systems, arranging the RCS loop, introducing and developing 16 modular construction. 17 The eye test down here is a very, very 18 detailed construction schedule which I certainly don't 19 intend to get into, but it is based on actual sort of 20 21 bottoms-up, you know, piece by piece building. 22 The design approach results in major 23 simplifications in the design which help construction 24 schedule, help safety in terms of having fewer things to worry about, maintain, inspect and test. 25

accident PRA has been incorporated into the design from the beginning of the development program. AP600 has been licensed before, which is a stepping stone with a big step forward helping us go ahead with AP1000, and of course, behind it is a lot of testing that you've hear about to prove out the passive systems.

Of course, the thing about AP1000 is trying to increase the power sufficiently so that we can be competitive in the deregulated U.S. power market.

We had a lot of constraints that we put on ourselves to maximize the use of AP600 design basis and all the information we did, and in particular, the structures. We basically didn't change any of the plan view of the structures. We did have to raise the containment a bit. I'll show you some more of that later.

In our mind we needed to retain the AP600 proven component, and this, in particular, the power generation, the core, the reactor, the steam generator, the reactor coolant pumps, those things.

And of course, this all then relates to the basis and the credibility of the cost estimate and construction schedule and all of that. And of course,

we had been talking about licensing with you, and we're nearing completion of that process, and having piggybacked on AP600 has obviously helped us all.

The design features, the basic design features are the same as AP600. We are talking about an integrated plant design, the proof in components, no prototype, simplified loop and canned pumps, passive systems, increased safety margins, a simplified defense-in-depth systems, the digital I&C pump at control room (phonetic), and optimize plant arrangement incorporating construction maintenance, modularization, and all of that.

CHAIRMAN KRESS: What's your experience base with hand motor pumps of that size? Have you --

MR. SCHULZ: The pumps that we were going to use in AP600 were of very similar size to what's been the latest Navy pumps in the carriers.

CHAIRMAN KRESS: I see.

MR. SCHULZ: So that size pump has got a solid, very direct basis. The pumps for the AP1000 are a little bigger. The experience that the pump designers have had in, for example, creating the Navy pumps which were a step up from pumps they had before was very good. They've developed design techniques and the test development programs that they have seem

1 to be effective in these incremental increases in pump sizes. 2 3 So the pump for AP1000 hasn't been built 4 exactly, but things that are near to it have been 5 built, and there has been confidence and good experience in making, you know, such size increases. 6 7 DR. RANSOM: As long as we're asking questions, what was the nth in the cost on the first 8 slide? 9 10 MR. SCHULZ: What's that? Six? Three, 11 three plants. 12 Or three, that's a third DR. RANSOM: plant? 13 14 MR. SCHULZ: Yes. 15 AP1000 is going to start out at a higher level of design detail than we did in the paste. 16 17 I think we'll be a sharper learning curve. You've seen the main loop. 18 is Ιt 19 obviously a two-loop plant, four pumps. Having four pumps does minimize the size of the pumps, which helps 20 21 us in incorporating the canned motor pumps. 22 The fuel internals, reactor vessel, are 23 very similar to the Doel Tihange 3, which were three-24 loop plants with a similar power rating. South Texas has similar internals, but it's obviously a four-loop 25

1 plant and a little bit bigger. There's no bottom on 2 instrumentation. So the traditional Westinghouse 3 movable in-core instrumentation has been eliminated. 4 Again, this is the same as AP600. 5 Improved materials for 60-year life. We have a larger steam generator, which is 6 7 similar to what the Westinghouse CE type design, and in the System 80 and Westinghouse-Pittsburgh has 8 9 actually built replacement steam generators of a similar size. 10 11 We talked a little about the canned motor 12 they have a lot of benefits for the plant pumps. design in terms of new seals that can fail, can leak, 13 14 and from an accident point of view, they also require 15 maintenance of the utilities like that. So these pumps are very almost maintenance free. 16 17 There's a lot of good experience, history mostly in the nuclear Navy, but also in some earlier 18 19 like shipping support in Yankee Rowe (phonetic) 20 plants. 21 The main loop piping has been greatly simplified. 22 Each leg has got a weld on either end. 23 So there's fewer welds in between. The supports

generator, they're not supported directly; just the

connected

to

the

are

the pumps

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12 1 steam generator. 2 The pressurizer is larger, which gives us 3 operating margins relative to operating plants. 4 Approach to safety, we use our, quote, 5 unquote, passive safety systems which do rely on realignment, a one time realignment of valves, but 6 7 does not rely on any active pumps, diesels, fans to 8 operate. So once we realign the systems into their 9 passive safety mode, they continue operating without 10 11 the need for support systems. The only support system 12 we actually do need, of course, is anything involved with realigning the valves. A lot of the valves are 13 14 fail safe, which then means if you lose power, lose 15 the I&C system completely, they go to the safe 16 position. 17 There's a few of them, like the ADS valves which need to be powered. So we do need electrical 18 19 power in I&C. 20 Importance of operator reactions has been 21 significantly reduced. You can see that in some of 22 the PRA numbers.

Design basis accidents are met with just the passive systems, without reliance on the non-The PRA safety goals can be met without the safety.

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non-safety systems.

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We do still have active non-safety related systems for normal reactor make-up, start-up feedwater. These things reliably support normal They can also minimize the challenges to the passive safety systems by dealing with anticipated occurrences. They typically have redundant active equipment powered by on-site, non-safety diesels, design required to mitigate again, not accidents.

CHAIRMAN KRESS: On the use of the active systems, I presume that they're being used to compensate for some transient or some accident that you don't want the passive systems to come on. Would they completely overwhelm the passive if you needed them because of the driving forces?

They probably wouldn't even know the passive systems were there, except for maybe the tanks that blow down from the nitrogen.

MR. SCHULZ: The potential interaction of active and passive systems was a significant discussion we had on AP600. A lot of the both SPES and OSU testing incorporated active features as well as passive features so that we could not only analyze, which we did do, but the tests, the potential

interactions.

And basically we didn't see anything which was adverse. Now, there are some almost designed-in interactions. For example, if you have ADS, one of the things the operators are told to do is to start the shutdown cooling system in an injection mode, and that's a nonsafety feature.

One of the purposes of that is to provide a back-up in case something goes wrong, but it also avoids the need for Stage IV, and the way it does it is it interacts with the core make-up tank draining because it goes into the same line and through the same orifice that limits the same T drain down. It builds up back pressure, and as long as it's pumping, --

CHAIRMAN KRESS: The core make-up tank just --

MR. SCHULZ: -- core make-up tank stops about half full or something, depending exactly on when the operators start that, but it's still active aligned. So if the RNS stops, then the CMT would start going again, and then you'd get Stage IV, and then you'd get gravity injection of RWST injection.

So that's one interaction that was really designed into the plant, but for example, start-up

feedwater to passive OHR, now those are a bit more functionally connected differently. So we don't really see an interaction.

We do have automatic signals to cut off the nonsafety features if things degrade, okay, and we really need the passive features. So if you're getting like a steam line break and you're getting excessive cooling, that signals stop start-up feedwater because that could be contributing to excessive cool-down.

Just because we start passive RHR, we don't cut off start-up feedwater, but if there's a plant condition overfilling of the steam generator, over cooling of the RCS will cut off start-up feedwater, and we do similar things with the CDS make-up to make sure we don't overfill the pressurizer because of it.

On overview of the passive core cooling system. You see all of the major components here. The passive RHR, of course, is the transient, non-LOCA decay heat removal feature. Natural circulation. It puts heat into the RWST, which is inside containment. That provides a heat sync for several hours, and then it starts boiling. The steam goes into containment, passive containment cooling system, condenses it, and

1 it drains back into the RWST with a gutter collection 2 That's all safety related. That basically replaces the function of 3 4 safety related auxiliary feedwater system in the 5 current plan. The passive safety injection is made up of 6 7 the core make-up tanks, which are a unique feature to AP600, AP1000. These replace the high head pumps, and 8 9 they can operate at any RCS pressure. For minor leaks 10 and tube rupture they operate in a water recirculation mode, and they never really drain down in that 11 12 situation. For small LOCAs, you would eventually 13 14 transition into a steam drain down mode when the cold 15 leg is voided. For larger LOCAs that happens pretty quickly without any water recirculation. 16 17 Accumulators, of course, work similar to 18 current plants, except they're connected to the 19 reactor vessel directly. So for large LOCAs, you 20 don't spill one. The RWST injection is a very low pressure, 21 22 just a gravity hit of the tank, and from a functional 23 point of view, they really replace the low head safety 24 injection pumps. We eventually would get into a

containment recirculation, which uses the containment

1	to drive the flow-through screens and into the
2	DR. WALLIS: And presumably you have no
3	fibrous insulation.
4	MR. SCHULZ: We have no fibrous
5	insulation. That's right. We've talked about that.
6	DR. WALLIS: And you have a very clean
7	containment?
8	MR. SCHULZ: A very clean containment. We
9	still have screens with a good surface area. So we
LO	can tolerate some degree in
L1	DR. WALLIS: But you don't have much head
L2	to drive that closed.
L3	MR. SCHULZ: We don't have much head,
L4	right. Now, current plants don't have a lot of head
L5	tolerance either because they have to supply NPSH to
L6	pumps. So I'm not sure that the head requirements are
L7	all that different.
L8	MR. ROSEN: When you say "a good screen,"
L9	do you know what square footage you're talking about?
20	MR. SCHULZ: It's bigger than typical
21	plants, although that could be changing and plants
22	vary. It's about the trash rack is about 70 square
23	feet each, but the screen is a folded design which has
24	more than twice that surface area. So it's more like
25	140 square feet each, each of the two screens.

1 MR. ROSEN: So you have 280 square feet? 2 MR. SCHULZ: Yes, and the screens are 3 cross-connected such that if one of the passive core 4 cooling system recirc. lines fails to open or is 5 blocked, both screens will function to feed the intact lines. 6 7 MR. ROSEN: Would you have a big problem if somebody said you needed four times as much square 8 9 I mean, is there a space for more? footage? 10 I mean, this is a current issue and really 11 you don't know where it's going. 12 MR. SCHULZ: It is a current issue. screens are located along walls. 13 We have some 14 vertical height to play with. We don't have 15 necessarily a lot of width to play with. We probably 16 could do something. I mean, you always can do things with the areas. 17 18 CHAIRMAN KRESS: But whatever the 19 resolution of this issue is, you guys have made it 20 what, a COL action item? 21 MR. SCHULZ: Yes. Yeah, we've done some 22 preliminary work on resident debris and DPs across the 23 screens, but the staff and we recognize we couldn't 24 really resolve it now given the state of knowledge. 25 So we ended up putting a COL that will be recalculated

1	based on more definitive information from testing and
2	plant feedback, although we have a very robust design.
3	With the last of fiberglass insulation, with larger
4	screens than operating plants, with folded screen
5	designs which tend to be good from a debris trapping
6	point of view, we've got these horizontal plates that
7	protect the screens from heavier debris settling in
8	front of them.
9	It doesn't protect them against fibrous
10	type debris which tends to move with the flow. We
11	have done a lot of things to improve the design and
12	make it robust, but until we get a final resolution of
13	the data, the information, we can't confirm that
14	everything is okay.
15	DR. RANSOM: What is the mesh size f the
16	screens?
17	MR. SCHULZ: It's pretty much a standard.
18	I think it's one-eighth of an inch. I'm not 100
19	percent sure about that. It's controlled by a fuel
20	page openings like current plants.
21	We don't have
22	DR. RANSOM: It is about an eighth of an
23	inch, you say?
24	MR. SCHULZ: I think. I think that's
25	right. I'll confirm that.

DR. RANSOM: And the other question is: is there any paint in the containment.

MR. SCHULZ: Yes, there is paint in the containment. There's sort of two things to think about there. One of them is on the inside of the containment shell, which, of course, is involved in our passive heat, transfer heat cooling system, is an inorganic zinc which is safety related. Okay? And it's safety related because we want to make sure that the heat conduction is properly accounted for, and also the wetting and the film formation on the inside of the containment.

It's not as critical as outside where we want the thin water cooling film to form a nice, spread out surface, and we don't want rivulets running down. Inside of the containment we tested it with the inorganic zinc on it. So we've kind of ended up with that being a safety requirement.

So we expect that to stay put. If it doesn't, it's not an issue because it's 85 percent zinc. So it's very heavy. So, you know, it will sink, especially with our screens. There's, you know, two foot below the bottom of the screen. The screens are ten to 13 feet high, and then there's this horizontal plate on top of them. So the zinc can't

1 enter the water right in front of the screen. It has 2 got to enter ten feet in front of the screen, and it 3 will sink before it gets to the screen. 4 Now, there are other coatings inside 5 containment on concrete walls or steel walls that are part of our modules. These will typically be epoxies. 6 7 they will re purchased as safety related, qualified coatings with a high density, specified density, where 8 we've shown that that kind of a density will result in 9 the paint chips if they were to come loose to sink 10 11 before it gets to the screens. 12 Now, the actual application and maintenance of the coatings is not required to be 13 14 safety in this plant. 15 DR. RANSOM: There's some concern about This is borated water, I assume. 16 chemical reaction. 17 MR. SCHULZ: Yes. DR. RANSOM: And how it would react with 18 19 the coatings. 20 MR. SCHULZ: Again, these are qualified 21 Okay? So to the extent we know about the 22 coatings, as in operating plants, the coatings are supposed to stand up to that environment. 23 24 The issues of chemical debris, chemical 25 corrosion, debris related to screens is part of the

1	COL item that will have to be revisited for the COL.
2	DR. RANSOM: One other quick. What is the
3	diameter of the CMT balance lines?
4	MR. SCHULZ: Those are eight inch Schedule
5	160. The inside diameter is 6.8-something. That's
6	the same size as the injection line, by the way.
7	Those are the same size lines for AP600 and AP1000.
8	We get more flow in AP1000 by changing the orifice,
9	which we had a fairly strong orifice, small orifice
10	for AP600. We've opened it up a bit for AP1000 to get
11	a little more flow.
12	MR. SIEBER: Is there any aluminum in
13	containment?
14	MR. SCHULZ: I think there's allowed to be
15	some limited amount, but it's typically not used. We
16	use some galvanized steel for ratings in stairs and
17	things like that, cable trays. I don't
18	MR. SIEBER: No insulation jacketing or
19	anything like that?
20	MR. SCHULZ: No, would not be aluminum,
21	no.
22	DR. RANSOM: What kind of insulation is
23	used?
24	MR. SCHULZ: For the thermal insulation,
25	it's the metal reflective foil type.

	23
1	DR. RANSOM: Multiple layers?
2	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes. It has been shown
3	that especially in the flow fields that we all have,
4	that kind of insulation even if damaged will sink.
5	It's stainless steel.
6	DR. RANSOM: Aren't the layers separated
7	by fibers?
8	MR. SIEBER: No.
9	MR. SCHULZ: No, no.
10	DR. RANSOM: And particles?
11	MR. SIEBER: No.
12	MR. SCHULZ: No.
13	DR. RANSOM: No?
14	MR. SIEBER: Air.
15	MR. SCHULZ: Just air, and it's not leak-
16	tight.
17	MR. SIEBER: Pure air.
18	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Is the ADS four-line
19	aimed in a direction? Is it away from any of this
20	fibrous area or this insulation?
21	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. I t's basically aimed at
22	a compartment wall.
23	CHAIRMAN KRESS: It's at a wall?
24	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. So it will probably
25	remove some paint from that wall.
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1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: How far is that wall from
2	the
3	MR. SCHULZ: Not terribly far. A few
4	feet.
5	MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins.
6	I think it's between two and three feet.
7	We actually take the thrust loads on it by hooking
8	back into the wall.
9	MR. ROSEN: Two and three feet, and how
10	big a line is it?
11	MR. CUMMINS: It's a 14 inch line. The ID
12	of the valve is like nine inches.
13	DR. WALLIS: It's impinging on a piece of
14	steel though, isn't it?
15	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, it's a steel module,
16	modular.
17	DR. WALLIS: It would eat the concrete if
18	it was
19	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
20	DR. WALLIS: part of the concrete.
21	MR. SCHULZ: But there's not concrete.
22	Well, there's concrete behind steel. It's protected
23	by the steel. It's part of the steel modules that
24	make up the compartment walls.
25	CHAIRMAN KRESS: How thick are those
•	

1	walls? The steel?
2	MR. SCHULZ: The steel?
3	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah.
4	MR. CUMMINS: Ed Cummins again.
5	That's a structural requirement because it
6	is the reinforcement, and I'm not sure I remember. I
7	think it's quarter inch.
8	DR. WALLIS: So that steel is going to
9	swell up.
10	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, it's going to.
11	DR. SHACK: Which of the piping is
12	designed to be leaked before a break?
13	MR. SCHULZ: Basically everything well,
14	in these lines here, all of these lines are at least
15	eight inches, except for Stage 1 ADS up here, which is
16	four inch. All of the eight inch lines in all of
17	these things you see here are leak before break. The
18	four inch is not.
19	DR. SHACK: Okay. So it stops at the four
20	inch.
21	MR. SCHULZ: Right.
22	MR. CUMMINS: We weren't allowed to have
23	four inch.
24	MR. SCHULZ: So six inch and up is leak
25	before break, and that includes everything here except

1	for Stage I.
2	Here's a little bit more detail on the
3	passive RHR system. Normally isolated by
4	DR. WALLIS: What do you do with something
5	like the diaphragm in the ADS-4 value? Is that leak
6	before break or what do you do with something like
7	that?
8	MR. SCHULZ: The diaphragm?
9	DR. WALLIS: Well, the Squib valve.
10	MR. SIEBER: The gate.
11	DR. WALLIS: What do you do with that in
12	terms of leak before break? That could fail
13	presumably.
14	MR. CUMMINS: I believe it has the same
15	acceptance criteria as the pipe. So it is qualified
16	for leak before break.
17	MR. SCHULZ: This configuration is
18	identical to AP600. The elevations are identical.
19	The pipe sizes were increased from I think ten to 14
20	inch to support more flow. The tube surface area was
21	increased by adding a few tubes and making the
22	horizontal sections longer to get about the same
23	amount of power increase as the power in the core went
24	up.
25	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Do you have a drain line

1	in the bottom of the reactor vessel?
2	MR. SCHULZ: No. No penetration.
3	CHAIRMAN KRESS: How do you get the water
4	out when you want to?
5	MR. SIEBER: Put a pipe down there.
6	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
7	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Suck it out.
8	PARTICIPANT: Suck hard.
9	MR. SCHULZ: If you need to. You don't
10	normally have to do that.
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, I was thinking
12	about when you go to mid-loop operation or whatever.
13	MR. SCHULZ: Well, you don't. You leave
14	the water down there. Your mid-loop, you go to a mid
15	it's actually not quite mid-loop. It's about
16	three-quarters full hot leg, and you drain water out.
17	It actually comes out of the RNS piping, which comes
18	off the bottom of the hot leg, and off of the RNS
19	piping is the connection to the CDS, and that gets
20	automatically isolated, that drain line, if the water
21	level starts getting low in the hot leg to protect RNS
22	pump.
23	The passive safety injection, we've talked
24	about the major components here. Again, the types of
25	valves that we're using are identical with AP600. The

1 configuration. The only real change in same 2 configuration is this MOV is normally closed, shown 3 normally closed in AP600. We've opened it to improve 4 the PRA reliability because the MOV is a lot less 5 reliable than the Squib valve. So in terms of -- this line has a dual 6 7 It's both a recirc. line during a LOCA. It's also the line we use in a severe accident to dump 8 the IRWC. Obviously this line can't be used because 9 of the check valve, and of course, there's two of 10 11 these, two screens and two sets of these valves, and 12 so this line has a dual purpose to dump, and by opening that valve, we've reduced the probability of 13 14 failure of not being able --15 DR. WALLIS: Now, the ADS-4 line goes to We noticed that. 16 the PRHR. 17 MR. SCHULZ: On one of them, right. DR. WALLIS: Right, and we had a question 18 19 about that. I'm not sure if that was resolved or not. 20 What happens during the ADS-4 operation? Does flow go 21 up that line as well? 22 We had a question about that, I remember, 23 and I thought you were going to get that resolved. It 24 presumably was resolved at some time. Maybe we should 25 ask the staff.

1	MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins.
2	You have the ADS-4. You have sufficient
3	cooling just from a feed-and-bleed sort of thing. I
4	believe our analysis model shows a very little bit of
5	flow goes into the PRHR, but it doesn't really
6	contribute to the
7	DR. WALLIS: It seemed to be going the
8	wrong way is the thing. Maybe we could ask the staff
9	about that. It's in the minutes of our meeting.
10	MR. SCHULZ: I remember it being
11	discussed.
12	The core makeup tanks are about 25 percent
13	larger, and the flow is about 25 percent greater. The
14	RWST surface area is the same, but we've raised the
15	water level, normal water level. So we've got a
16	little bit more head and a little bit more water.
17	The injection lines from the RWST, the
18	recirc. lines, and the ADS-4 lines were made larger.
19	ADS-1, 2, and 3 are the same size as AP600.
20	DR. RANSOM: Well, you said there were no
21	bottom penetrations in that IRWST.
22	MR. SCHULZ: No, I said off the reactor
23	vessel.
24	DR. RANSOM: Oh, the reactor vessel.
25	Okay.

1 MR. SCHULZ: No, the RWST you need --2 DR. RANSOM: How do you get the water out 3 of the IRWST? 4 MR. SCHULZ: Yeah. Yes, there's little 5 pits, two pits that serve as bottom drains as well as injection lines out of the RWST. 6 7 We have а little bit more detailed information here about ADS-4 qualification, which we 8 understood there was maybe a question about that. So 9 the next three slides show you what commitments there 10 11 are in the DCD, what ITAACs there are, and the final 12 one is anticipated testing that Westinghouse would do to qualify the valve. 13 14 In terms of the DCD in the section shown 15 here, it basically says there's a need for valve qualification, pre-operational testing, and in-service 16 17 testing. I'm not going to talk any more about these They are also discussed in the DCD, but in 18 terms of valve qualification, there's a specific 19 requirement to verify the flow capability. It doesn't 20 21 say exactly how to do that, but it does address that, 22 and --23 That's an interesting test DR. WALLIS: 24 because you get varying qualities going into this

It tends to be a fairly interesting test to

thing.

1 supply the steam and the water and everything with 2 this big valve. I'll show you what we're 3 MR. SCHULZ: 4 planning on doing. Okay? It maybe is not quite as 5 interesting as you think it could be. (Laughter.) 6 7 DR. WALLIS: Oh, okay. Are you going to impinge on a steel plate when you come out of it? 8 9 MR. SIEBER: Once you test it, it's no 10 longer any good for anything. 11 MR. SCHULZ: Oh, no, that's not true. You 12 need to replace some internal parts, but the valve is the one --13 14 MR. SIEBER: Yeah, the ones that function. 15 MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, yes. That's what you're testing. 16 MR. SIEBER: 17 MR. SCHULZ: Well, actually you're testing the geometry once you've opened it. Okay? That's the 18 19 flow test. 20 Now, there's also will the valve open. 21 MR. SIEBER: Right. 22 Is a separate question, and MR. SCHULZ: 23 that's what this second one here is, to verify the opening capability, and this says you can do type 24 25 testing, ASME QME-1, as well as EEE type, as it

applies to the different components.

And this would be done considering some minimum-maximum DPs, limiting plant condition in terms of environmental aging, steam heat, as well as structural loads on the valve.

So this would be very --

MR. ROSEN: What can you do to assure us that the valve you actually test will be identical or so nearly identical that you can't tell the difference between it and the valve that's actually being used?

There's a concern that some of this testing is done on prototypical stuff that doesn't really represent the actual --

MR. SCHULZ: ASME QME-1 has a lot of criteria on that. One of the things that you have to deal with in a typical operating plant, although it's a little bit less -- it doesn't really apply so much to the ADS Stage IVs because they're going to be unique valves, bug if you have, say, a whole range of gate valves, motor operated gate valves in a plant design, how many of them do you have to test?

And that's where you get into the type testing and what are the restrictions in terms of how many tests you have to do so that you can show that all of the valves get qualified even though you don't

test every single size.

And there are issues, I think, that it addresses in terms of, you know, providing a -- and I think there's something in the ITAAC, which I didn't include in the next page, which talks about there will be a report that shows that the valve installed in the plant is covered by the testing an analysis done so that it's applicable.

And it is stated like that, and the staff would have to be satisfied that the report, in fact, justifies that.

MR. ROSEN: Well, you gave an example of a low range with different size gate valves, which is inapplicable to this case, but just talking about the ADS-4 valves, we know exactly or you know exactly what that's going to be. So it's just a question of how close you get. The valve you use for testing, how close is it going to be to the one that you actually use in the plants?

And that's my question.

MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, The only answer that I have in terms of what commitments have been made is what I said. Okay? Is that there will be a report that justifies that the valves tested are analyzed, is consistent with what's put into the plant.

1	Now, this valve is from a flow geometry
2	point of view, is very simple. It's like an orifice.
3	MR. SIEBER: A straight pipe.
4	DR. WALLIS: It's a straight pipe almost.
5	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. There's a little step-
6	down. There's a picture, two pages, ahead that we'll
7	show you.
8	DR. WALLIS: That's fine. The
9	interesting part is the up stream conditions. You've
10	got bends and things. So the up stream two-phased
11	pattern is going to be more important than just the
12	geometry. The geometry is simple. It's a straight
13	pipe.
14	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, I'm not sure what
15	happens to the diaphragm when they blow it off.
16	MR. SCHULZ: Okay.
17	MR. ROSEN: Why can't you just say a
18	simple thing, which is what I expected you to say,
19	which is we'll test the valve we use in the plant?
20	MR. SCHULZ: That's what we intend to do.
21	That's not a licensing commitment written down in the
22	VCD or the
23	MR. ROSEN: Why don't you make it? What's
24	the hardship?
25	MR. SCHULZ: Because when you say that,

1 that means if one rounded corner is a millimeter different, then it's not identical. So when you start 2 about saying "the same," it's very hard to pass that 3 4 test sometimes. 5 MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins. I think the way most of the industry works is that you try to 6 7 build the valve that you think that you want. That's the objective, and the testing process, you may find 8 that there's ways that you can improve the performance 9 the valve that you test, and you want 10 11 incorporate those improvements in the valve in the 12 plant, and whether you find that or not is not something that you know before you try this whole 13 14 thing. 15 So as you enter the qualification program, you start with an objective of producing the valve 16 17 that you are going to have in the plant. In the end you might decide that there's something that you can 18 19 improve, and then it's slightly different. 20 But then you go to QME-1 to see. If you 21 deviate too much, you fail in QME-1. 22 MR. SCHULZ: You have to retest if it's 23 too big of a change. 24 These are the specific ITAACs, and these 25 are kind of listed separately sort of by function.

1 there's a seismic capability function, and it says a 2 type test would be required and/or analysis. 3 Harsh environment. So this is the igniter 4 in the case of the Stage IV primarily, and again, type 5 tests or analysis. The change position function specifically 6 7 says tests or type tests. That doesn't give you any 8 option. 9 DR. WALLIS: But these kind of igniters have been in radiation environments before. 10 11 used in other nuclear systems. 12 MR. SCHULZ: Yes. They have been used in high temperature containments. The BWR is used in 13 14 radiation fields, but not inside containment. 15 WALLIS: the DR. And not at same 16 temperatures. Okay. 17 MR. SCHULZ: However, there а qualification program that the GE actually did for 18 19 their SBWR on a valve that looks very much like this for service conditions inside containment. 20 So they 21 developed and actually went through the qualification 22 of the propellant. 23 Then in terms of flow capability, these 24 are the commitments in terms of the ADS lines for 25 noncritical flow would be inspected and an analysis

1	would be done to show that the resistance is less than
2	some limiting value. It wasn't practical to actually
3	put flow through those lines. They're very big lines.
4	They discharge into the containment. So you'd need
5	more flow than we can produce from the RNS system, and
6	we don't really have a place to put it.
7	And given that the lines are simple from
8	a single phase or noncritical flow I shouldn't say
9	single phase we have this
10	DR. WALLIS: I wonder if any university
11	uses units of feet per gallons per minute squared.
12	(Laughter.)
13	DR. WALLIS: Most extraordinary units I've
14	seen in a long time.
15	MR. SCHULZ: We have had some
16	communication issues with us and our nuclear safety
17	buddies, but we sorted that out. So we have got
18	conversions that you can do. There are some
19	advantages to doing that, but it's not important.
20	For critical flow, we have an inspection
21	of the Stage IV valve which is to inspect the minimum
22	flow area. Again, this is very simple geometry.
23	DR. WALLIS: That's just a measurement,
24	isn't it? I mean, it can't be way off. It was made
25	with a certain diameter; it has got that diameter.

1	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes, and that's the real
2	important thing.
3	There's also one on the elevation of the
4	Stage IV to make sure it's proper.
5	So that's the DCD and the ITAAC. And this
6	is more what we intend to do, and the intention would
7	be to take the as designed valve and run it through
8	these tests. So if things work out well, we would end
9	up testing what we install.
10	MR. ROSEN: Now, this valve is bolted in.
11	MR. SCHULZ: The valve? Here you see the
12	pipe, and the pipe ends in a flange.
13	MR. ROSEN: So do you typically take this
14	valve out during each outage and do anything to it
15	or
16	MR. SCHULZ: No, not typically. What will
17	be happening on a sequential basis is that I think
18	every outage one of the four valves will have its
19	booster removed and test fired in a
20	MR. ROSEN: Let me tell you about my
21	concern. My concern is right there are the orifice,
22	right there at the
23	MR. SCHULZ: Here?
24	MR. ROSEN: No, the seal, what forms the
25	pressure boundary.

1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Right there.
2	MR. ROSEN: Right there. What I'm worried
3	about is cracking that proceeds along that line.
4	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, we've discussed that.
5	MR. ROSEN: Over time and ultimately
6	weakens the joint, and is there any way to detect
7	that?
8	MR. SCHULZ: We've discussed that in the
9	past with the ACRS. I don't know if you were here
10	when we did that, and we talked about we would do
11	inspections in accordance with ASME code requirements
12	to look at, in particular, that joint.
13	DR. WALLIS: Did you see any boron
14	stalactites hanging off the end of this valve?
15	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah.
16	DR. WALLIS: How do you do it? If you
17	don't take it off, how do you inspect that?
18	MR. SIEBER: The discharge is open.
19	MR. SCHULZ: This is open. There's
20	nothing connected on this site. So you can get very
21	close on this site. So if there's any leakage at
22	all
23	MR. ROSEN: Oh, well, yeah, you can see
24	leakage, but that's too late. I'm worried about
25	cracking that's not through wall.

1	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes. And the intention
2	is on, I guess, a plan basis. We would take the valve
3	off and actually inspect that.
4	MR. ROSEN: Yeah, I'd think you'd have to
5	look at it this way, with ultrasonics or dye penetrant
6	or something on that surface, and the only way to get
7	at it is to take the valve off.
8	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes.
9	MR. ROSEN: And then, you know, if you did
10	that fairly routinely for a while and there was no
11	cracking, why, you know, you could extend the
12	frequency dramatically, but I think at the beginning
13	you need to assure me, assure someone, yourselves, the
14	owner, that you're not going to have a LOCA right
15	there.
16	That's the nasty thing about relief
17	valves. They're designed to open, and sure enough,
18	they do.
19	Now, this is a special valve, granted, but
20	still, the cracking along that line would create
21	exactly the LOCA you're trying to prevent.
22	CHAIRMAN KRESS: What's the material? Is
23	it 609?
24	MR. SCHULZ: We are, I think, 316.
25	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Three, sixteen?

1	MR. SCHULZ: That's what we're thinking
2	right now, but I don't know that we've really made a
3	final determination. So obviously it's not a very big
4	part, and
5	DR. SHACK: It won't be Alloy 600 if
6	that's what you're thinking.
7	CHAIRMAN KRESS: That's what I was worried
8	about, yeah.
9	(Laughter.)
10	MR. SCHULZ: And so this will be something
11	that will be both the material selection, the
12	engineering of it will be done very, very carefully.
13	MR. ROSEN: See, I don't get any
14	confidence from you telling me that it's going to be
15	tested and inspected in accordance with the ASME code.
16	I mean, the code is great for a lot of things, but for
17	this particular circumstance, I don't know what the
18	code says about it.
19	Does it say you need to take it out and
20	inspect it every outage? That's kind of what I would
21	want to do for a while.
22	MR. SIEBER: No.
23	MR. ROSEN: Until I got real confidence
24	that there wasn't something special going on in there.
25	Tt's a highly stressed location Tt's in ovvgenated

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1	steam.
2	MR. SCHULZ: No, no steam. It's not
3	oxygenated.
4	MR. ROSEN: Why is there no steam against
5	the valve?
6	MR. SIEBER: It's water.
7	MR. SCHULZ: It's water from the hot leg.
8	MR. ROSEN: So you don't get steam until
9	it opens.
10	MR. SCHULZ: Right.
11	DR. WALLIS: You hope.
12	MR. ROSEN: You hope.
13	DR. WALLIS: If you get steam, there's a
14	crack.
15	MR. ROSEN: A crack wouldn't produce steam
16	here.
17	DR. WALLIS: No, but it would come out in
18	the
19	MR. ROSEN: Well, obviously as it goes
20	through the yes.
21	So what are the ASME test requirements?
22	You say it's going to be tested in accordance with the
23	ASME code. What are the ASME does that mean
24	everything, every ten years and once a ten-year cycle
25	or

1	MR. SCHULZ: That's my understanding. The
2	only thing that we've done differently than that is
3	say that it would be done on a sequential basis so
4	that you wouldn't wait ten years to do them all. You
5	do one of them and
6	MR. ROSEN: So you have four of them in
7	the plant, right?
8	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
9	MR. ROSEN: And you do one at two and a
LO	half years, another at five, another at seven and a
11	half, and the other at ten.
L2	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
L3	MR. ROSEN: Presumably. So we'll have to
L4	wait two and a half years before you see an inspection
L5	of this, of the first one.
L6	CHAIRMAN KRESS: That seems reasonable.
L7	MR. SEGALA: This is John Segala from the
L8	NRC staff. Back in the last future plant meeting, we
L9	have a copy of Westinghouse's slides at that time, and
20	they said in accordance with ASME every ten years
21	perform the following: measure sheer cap dimensions
22	to assure no thinning. Perform dye penetrant tests to
23	insure no cracking. Use staggered testing.
24	That's what they said back at the last
25	meeting.

1	MR. ROSEN: That's pretty consistent with
2	what was just said. So that means staggered testing
3	every ten years, four valves, two and a half years.
4	Well, how long is the operating cycle?
5	How long is your operating cycle going to be?
6	MR. SCHULZ: Oh, the fuel cycle is more
7	like a year, 18 months.
8	MR. ROSEN: So this would probably be in
9	the second operating cycle you would have to do the
LO	first valve 36 months into it roughly.
L1	DR. WALLIS: The figure we had shows
L2	something attached to the outlet. There's obviously
L3	some holes for bolts at the outlet.
L4	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
L5	DR. WALLIS: What is on there?
L6	MR. SCHULZ: In our design there will be
L7	nothing.
L8	DR. WALLIS: Ah, there will be nothing.
L9	MR. SCHULZ: The drawing was taken from
20	another application that actually was going to have a
21	pipe.
22	DR. WALLIS: Okay. I thought there was
23	nothing those I thought owns has something those
23	nothing there. I thought ours has something there.
24	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes. These bolt holes

1	be any flange or any pipe connected to the outlet of
2	the valve.
3	DR. WALLIS: So the massive pieces of pipe
4	are hardly necessary.
5	MR. SCHULZ: Massive?
6	DR. WALLIS: The massive housing there is
7	hardly necessary. It doesn't attach to anything.
8	MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins.
9	I mentioned before that we have four
10	struts that come from the wall that hook to that end
11	thing so that when it blows even at full pressure,
12	that it doesn't cause damage to the rest of the
13	reactor coolant system.
14	So while there's no pipe at the end of
15	that, there are some pretty big lugs that go back to
16	the wall to take the force of the
17	DR. WALLIS: Thank you.
18	MR. SCHULZ: So we may still have those
19	old
20	MR. ROSEN: That's a very good idea
21	actually.
22	MR. SCHULZ: Okay. I was trying to go
23	through this here. From a valve operability point of
24	view, we will test the valve using both maximum and
25	minimum inlet pressures. Minimum pressures actually

1 can be potentially limiting in this valve because if 2 you have a high pressure in here, it has got this 3 connection stress, and it may be a little bit easier 4 to break it off. 5 With very, very low inlet pressures, then all of the force necessary to shear that point needs 6 7 to come from the booster assembly. So we will test both conditions to make sure that the valve will 8 9 function in both cases, and we will use a degraded booster by an arbitrary amount. I think what has bene 10 11 used in the past has like a 80 percent booster to, 12 again, provide some margin and robustness to the design. 13 14 From a flow capability, our intentions are 15 to use a water flow, pulled water flow test to establish an L/D of the valve and then to do a 16 saturated steam flow test to basically give us an 17 effective flow area, which is what the nuclear safety 18 19 people use as an input to their safety analysis. 20 So there is no two-phased DR. WALLIS: 21 testing. 22 That's right. MR. SCHULZ: 23 And everything is done DR. WALLIS: 24 theoretical in terms of a fee squared (phonetic) or 25 some --

1	MR. SCHULZ: Well, it's not theoretical.
2	It's based on the testing we've done at OSU and
3	DR. WALLIS: Scaled up from OSU.
4	MR. SCHULZ: So we use OSU to establish
5	the system kid of interaction performance. This test
6	is really making sure the valve is consistent with the
7	systems test and the system analysis.
8	DR. WALLIS: Typically if you know the
9	water flow capability, you can convert it to steam
10	flow. So it shouldn't be very interesting.
11	MR. SCHULZ: We hope not.
12	And then, of course, there's the
13	environmental considerations with irradiation, steam,
14	and heat aging, which would cover the whole life cycle
15	of the boosters from storage normal standby condition
16	and then post accident conditions, and then the aged
17	boosters, it would be actuated to show that they would
18	work.
19	And then there would also be seismic and
20	other dynamic load testing, which is envisioned to be
21	a shaker table kind of thing.
22	DR. WALLIS: Now, this is a dead end pipe
23	with hot water in it.
24	MR. SCHULZ: Normally hot water. There
25	is, say, a partial loop seal.

1	DR. WALLIS: Right. No, what I'm thinking
2	is
3	MR. SCHULZ: Which means that this going
4	to be
5	DR. WALLIS: these things where you get
6	weird circulation patterns and you get thermal
7	fatigue.
8	MR. SCHULZ: This system is all well
9	insulated right up to this flange. So
10	DR. WALLIS: But it is cool at the end,
11	isn't it?
12	MR. SCHULZ: The end is
13	MR. SIEBER: Cooler.
14	MR. SCHULZ: cooler.
15	DR. WALLIS: Right.
16	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, but because of the size
17	of the pipe and the fact that it doesn't dip very
18	much, it's going to be
19	DR. WALLIS: It's probably all right.
20	It's just that there are these events where you get
21	weird circulation patterns which get intermittent. So
22	there's a temperature cycling at the end of the pipe.
23	DR. SHACK: Well, the good news is this
24	valve won't leak.
25	DR. WALLIS: Yes. It's probably okay.

1 MR. SIEBER: Theoretically. 2 I guess it's something to DR. WALLIS: 3 bear in mind always when you get this sort 4 situation. 5 MR. ROSEN: You mentioned the degraded booster with the 80 percent. How did you pick that 6 7 number? Why wouldn't you use 30 percent or some other 8 number? 9 MR. SCHULZ: That's something that the 10 vendor has suggested and used from his experience base 11 with these type of valves. What he's told us is that 12 if applying at 20 percent margin will cover, more than cover the kind of changes that they might have seen in 13 14 making the boosters, they put a lot of quality control 15 on the boosters when they make the propellant initially, test it in samples, and then when they make 16 17 a batch of boosters, they test, you know, some boosters right away to make sure they're okay. 18 19 And the tolerance and variation that they 20 get in that is significantly less than that 21 percent, though that seems to be adequate to cover 22 reasonable variations in the boosters in terms of 23 manufacturing and environmental effects. 24 DR. SHACK: When you replace a booster, do

you then go off and blow it up?

1 MR. SCHULZ: Yes. 2 So you'll have a check on DR. SHACK: that. 3 4 MR. SCHULZ: That's a standard ASME in-5 service testing for a Squib valve. They've actually got it codified. That's what we've committed to do in 6 7 the CD, is that when we replace the booster and there's a schedule for that, we would then take the 8 one that was in the valve and then go test it to make 9 sure it would have been okay, and if there's any 10 11 problem shown up, then you use your tracing of finding 12 similar boosters and maybe replacing them or go root cause and try to figure out what went wrong and that 13 14 kind of stuff. 15 But that does give you a reasonable check on if it would work. 16 17 MR. SIEBER: The effect of using a very degraded booster, actually what you're doing, it takes 18 19 a certain amount of energy to get the valve to 20 So if you want to test it in a degraded operate. 21 mode, the only way you can do that is make a larger 22 booster, which makes a larger actuator housing and a 23 larger valve for no real purpose. 24 MR. SCHULZ: Other than the margin, right. MR. SIEBER: Other than that test. 25

1	MR. SCHULZ: So if you kind of overdo
2	that, then the valve is getting huge.
3	MR. SIEBER: Yeah, and perhaps less likely
4	to work because all of the parts are heavier.
5	DR. WALLIS: The propellant does
6	deteriorate with time at these temperatures. Isn't
7	that
8	MR. SIEBER: Yes.
9	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. In fact, one of the
10	things about this, since this pipe is hot, you'll
11	notice there's fins here.
12	DR. WALLIS: I was assuming that most of
13	this whole thing is pretty well at primary
14	temperature.
15	MR. SCHULZ: Well, the booster is supposed
16	to be less than 280 degrees or something.
17	DR. WALLIS: It's as cold as that?
18	MR. SCHULZ: And in order to make it that
19	cold, the valve body is not insulated, and there's
20	fins located here. There's also vertical fins around
21	the top of this housing, and a test will be done with
22	this at maximum design inlet temperature.
23	DR. WALLIS: So there is quite a lot of
24	heat transfer going on in that area then. So that's
25	okay.

1	MR. SIEBER: Which causes some internal
2	food.
3	DR. WALLIS: So you have water coming in
4	at primary temperature going through some natural
5	circulation in there and some of it leaving that may
6	be two or 300 degrees colder?
7	MR. SCHULZ: No, I don't
8	DR. WALLIS: No? Well, you said that
9	temperature is
10	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, the temperature up here.
11	The temperatures here will be much closer to
12	DR. WALLIS: To uniform, the primary
13	temperature. Okay.
14	MR. SCHULZ: That's an awful big pipe
15	connected here.
16	DR. WALLIS: Yeah.
17	MR. SCHULZ: Okay. Moving on to passive
18	containment cooling, we've talked a little bit about
19	this. Again, the same configuration as AP600, except
20	we added a third valve path, which was due to PRA
21	considerations, and it is a different normally closed
22	valve. It's a motor operated gate valve instead of
23	air operated butterfly valves, and that was done to
24	add diversity as well as redundancy to help the PRA.
25	And the reason we did that is because

there's a slight chance that if you were running on air only cooling in AP1000 that the containment could fail after a day, whereas in AP600, you could go basically indefinitely with design basis and ambient conditions and not fail the containment at emergency stress limits. But with AP1000 we have a little less margin. So to compensate for that, we added a more reliable water drain system. We did increase the volume of the tank in order to account for the fact that we have higher decay heat. The standpipes control the flow of water. With all standpipes running, we have a relatively high flow rate that lasts for about three or four hours. That quickly establishes the water film initially and also it is greater than decay heat so that the containment pressure has tended to be dropped down in that time frame. After that, the stand pipes are arranged to more or less follow decay heat out through the 72 hours. MR. SIEBER: There is a -- if those valves

fail, there is an operator action in the SAM-Gs (phonetic) to go up on the side of the containment and open the valves manually. Do you have a ladder built

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1	into the containment?
2	MR. SCHULZ: There's stairs and ladders,
3	depending on
4	MR. SIEBER: That gets to those valves?
5	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes.
6	MR. CUMMINS: There's actually an
7	elevator, kind of a crawler elevator and stairs, and
8	then the plant vent is up there, too. So you need to
9	go inspect the air inlet. So there's a reason that
10	you want to be up there periodically anyway, and so we
11	needed to be able to get there easily.
12	MR. SIEBER: Are the stairs between the
13	concrete and the steel liner?
14	MR. SCHULZ: No. They're on the outside.
15	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
16	MR. SCHULZ: Obviously the valves are
17	actually inside the concrete area. They have to be
18	protected from
19	MR. SIEBER: Right.
20	MR. SCHULZ: in the environment, but
21	eventually you have to go inside.
22	MR. SIEBER: So you've got to get in
23	there.
24	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. There are obviously
25	then conditions where you might not want to go up

1	there. If you had a
2	MR. SIEBER: I could think of hundreds
3	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
4	MR. SIEBER: of reasons not to.
5	MR. SCHULZ: Now, there are other ways of
6	getting water up there. We have a pipe that goes up
7	to the same drain point where we can put the water
8	from the fire protection system. We can also put
9	water from the Demion (phonetic) water system. We can
10	also put water from fire trucks or something.
11	So there are a multitude of other ways of
12	getting water up there if you cannot get up there and
13	open those valves up.
14	DR. SHACK: How robust is that concrete
15	shield building around the containment?
16	MR. SIEBER: How thick is it?
17	MR. CUMMINS: It's three feet thick.
18	MR. SCHULZ: With lots of rebar.
19	MR. CUMMINS: By the structure. Rebar is
20	because of the structural requirements.
21	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. Yeah, because it's
22	supporting the concrete tank and
23	MR. SIEBER: So it's sort of like the
24	current ice containment.
25	MR. CUMMINS: Yes.

1 MR. SCHULZ: Yes. I had mentioned safety 2 margins, and here's a listing of some key accidents 3 and criteria and comparing a typical Westinghouse PWR 4 against AP600 and AP1000. Loss of flow limits is 5 significantly better than operating plants and AP1000 is a little better than AP600. 6 7 The feed line break analysis, again, AP600 and AP1000 are much better than operating plants. 8 AP1000 is not quite as good as AP600, but again, still 9 much bigger than operating. 10 11 Computer tube rupture, although it's not 12 very interesting from a thermal hydraulic analysis point of view, it can be challenging in a sense of the 13 14 operators have to do a lot of things in operating 15 plants. They have to do things. AP600 and AP1000, the operators don't have 16 17 to do anything. I mean there are procedures to do things to minimize operation of passive systems and 18 19 things like that, but if they do nothing, the plant is 20 still okay, and that's the way the plant is actually 21 analyzed in Chapter 15 in the CDC. 22 Small LOCA, again --23 MR. ROSEN: Have you looked at errors of 24 commission, operators doing the wrong things? 25 there any set of those that you've looked at?

1 MR. SCHULZ: The way you have to really 2 look at that is in how you design the man-machine interface and emergency procedures to avoid doing 3 4 that. Ultimately you get to the point where the 5 operators could turn things off like TMI. That can still happen, and the main 6 7 defense that you have against that is to, first of all, try to avoid putting the operator in a situation 8 where you could have got conflicting goals. 9 doesn't want to overfill the pressurizer, but he needs 10 11 to keep the high hid (phonetic) pump on. Okay? 12 We have pretty much designed those kind of things out of AP600/AP1000. So we don't think he'll 13 14 be in that situation where he's damned if he does, 15 damned if he doesn't kind of thing. But still ultimately you have to rely on 16 17 training because you can postulate if the operator turns off the SI or cooling or something to the core, 18 19 he could eventually get into trouble. 20 Now, things will actuate, tend to actuate, 21 but eventually in order to allow recovery of the 22 plant, you have to be able to block the safety

but eventually in order to allow recovery of the plant, you have to be able to block the safety injection signals and start feedwater cooling or not startup, but passive RHR signals to be able to recover the plant from an accident.

23

24

1	So how do you know that's recovery versus,
2	you know, errors of commission? So you do the best
3	job you can from the design point of view and try to
4	minimize putting the operator in a situation where he
5	has got conflicting goals, and then you do a good job
6	on managing interface in terms of telling him is the
7	core being cooled; what are the temperatures and then
8	good emergency procedures on what he should be doing
9	and checking and rechecking to making sure that he has
10	not gone off and done something stupid.
11	MR. ROSEN: And you'll have a full scope
12	simulator.
13	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
14	MR. ROSEN: So that they can practice
15	doing the right thing and not doing the wrong thing.
16	MR. SCHULZ: We actually did a little bit
17	of prototyping of that in the AP600 days, but it was
18	not a full scope simulator at that point. We were
19	just starting to develop wall panels and the soft
20	touch controls because it's a new design. So we were
21	actually bringing some operators in to get some
22	preliminary experience, but the ultimate one will be
23	a full-scale simulator, yes.
24	DR. WALLIS: That's an Appendix K figure
25	or was there a 95th percentile, that large LOCA?

	39
1	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
2	DR. WALLIS: It's Appendix K?
3	MR. SCHULZ: Yes. No, excuse me, not
4	Appendix K. This is
5	DR. WALLIS: This is a realistic person.
6	MR. SCHULZ: With uncertainty.
7	DR. WALLIS: With uncertainty. This is a
8	95th percentile thing or something?
9	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
10	DR. WALLIS: I see.
11	MR. SCHULZ: So it's a very conservative
12	number. The best estimate or more realistic numbers
13	are 200 degrees plus cooler than that, lower
14	temperature.
15	And then ATWS is with the low boron core.
16	We have no exceedance of time during the core cycles,
17	and the pressures are lower.
18	MR. SIEBER: At the risk of causing
19	confusion, I'd like to ask one more question about
20	passive containment cooling.
21	MR. SCHULZ: Okay.
22	MR. SIEBER: And manually operating the
23	valves. You say the valves are inside the concrete
24	shield wall?
25	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
•	

1	MR. SIEBER: And as I recall it, the
2	operator has 24 hours to go up and open those valves
3	before the probability of containment failure
4	becomes
5	MR. SCHULZ: Non-zero.
6	MR. SIEBER: Well, it's .02.
7	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
8	MR. SIEBER: Okay. After 24 hours after
9	a LOCA, what's the radiation dose where those valves
10	are?
11	MR. SCHULZ: Well, it depends on what
12	happened. Okay? If it's a small LOCA, it's very,
13	very low. If the core is melted, he can't get up
14	there.
15	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
16	MR. SCHULZ: And he wouldn't even try. He
17	would use his other
18	MR. SIEBER: And so you go to the
19	increased probability of containment.
20	MR. SCHULZ: No, you go to putting water
21	up there from other sources.
22	MR. SIEBER: All right.
23	MR. SCHULZ: The other multitude of ways
24	of getting water up there.
25	DR. WALLIS: Well, you can be a hero and

61 1 go up there. 2 PARTICIPANT: Once. MR. SIEBER: Well, you probably have time 3 4 to open the valve. 5 MR. SCHULZ: We weren't putting that into the emergency procedures. 6 7 Moving on toward the risk part of the plant design, one of the things that's good to keep in 8 mind is the multiple levels of defense that have been 9 designed into AP1000, many more than the current 10 11 operating plant. This is showing a tube rupture as an 12 example, and operating plants have basically sort of two levels of defense. One is the safety one, which 13 14 is using I-head safety injection pumps, auxiliary 15 feedwater, and operator actions to reduce and stop the leak. 16 17 And then they have some other means to back that up which typically are in the PRA in the 18 feed-and-bleed type cooling thing where they would 19 reduce the RCS pressure, minimize the leakage. 20 21 leakage is not really isolated, and the RCS is vented 22 to the containment. And that is considered a success

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And if that doesn't work you get into core

For AP1000, the first level of defense

path.

damage.

23

24

1 shown here which is probably -- the way these are 2 shown is from the most likely to be used to the least 3 likely to be used. 4 In this case, the most likely to be used 5 is the operators would do the same things they would do in the operating plant, but instead using startup 6 7 feedwater, CVS makeup, and operator controls isolate the leak. 8 If he doesn't do that, then the passive 9 systems come into play automatically, and this is what 10 11 we show in the DCD, and that would also isolate the 12 leak through CMT, passive RHR, actuation, automatic isolation of DVS and startup feedwater, and steam 13 14 generator isolation. 15 And then if that doesn't work you get into several different kinds of, again, feed and bleed, the 16 17 pressurization schemes similar to this, but with some This kind of thinking ends up getting 18 variations. 19 built into the PRA event trees, and is the main reason why the probability of core melt from, say, tube 20 21 ruptures of other kind of things is much lower. 22 It's not just that we have a passive 23 system that's incredibly reliable. It's mainly that 24 we have many different ways of --

MR. SIEBER: Alternatives.

1	MR. SCHULZ: Alternatives.
2	DR. SHACK: And there's nothing he could
3	do in that first stage that would negate the action of
4	the passive safety system
5	MR. SCHULZ: Nothing? "Nothing" is a
6	pretty strong word.
7	DR. SHACK: "Nothing" is a big word, or
8	that's included in the PRA.
9	MR. SCHULZ: Typically what happens here,
10	in order to avoid getting into this, he's got to shut
11	the plant down without getting a safety injection
12	signal. So if you actually have a tube rupture that
13	captures the operators sort of off guard, they're not
14	aware of leaking and they're not following the event
15	and they're not shutting the plant down, then you tend
16	to get into this second mode here.
17	If the operators are tracking leakage and
18	they're anticipating what's going on and they
19	DR. WALLIS: They anticipate a ST tube
20	rupture?
21	MR. SCHULZ: Well
22	MR. SIEBER: Yes, you can.
23	DR. WALLIS: Can you?
24	MR. CUMMINS: There's steam radiation
25	detectors.

1	DR. WALLIS: So it is leaking first. It
2	hasn't ruptured yet.
3	MR. ROSEN: Yeah. You track this very
4	small leakage over long periods of time.
5	MR. SIEBER: Detectability is pretty good
6	in current plants.
7	MR. SCHULZ: So if they get into this mode
8	here, they can completely avoid, potentially
9	completely avoid the start-up of the passive RHRs.
10	Now, if they're in that mode and the steam generator
11	water level is going up because they're not doing
12	something, they're not being effective at terminating
13	a leakage, that will stop, automatically isolates
14	startup feedwater and CVS, which is one of his main
15	tools.
16	DR. WALLIS: So they could block the ADS
17	line presumably if they were really foolish and
18	prevent it opening?
19	MR. SCHULZ: Well, yeah. The ADS is not
20	going to come into play.
21	DR. WALLIS: No, but I think the question
22	was is there anything they could do to prevent success
23	by the later paths.
24	MR. SCHULZ: Okay. I was addressing this
25	guy versus this guy.

1 DR. WALLIS: Right, but the later ones, it 2 all depends on ADS working. 3 MR. SCHULZ: Some level of ADS working. 4 Now, you basically have to block the CMT actuation, 5 which is a precursor or necessary to get ADS, which you can do, but again, from a procedures point of view 6 7 they shouldn't need to do that when they're just doing this. 8 So it would be only if this thing starts 9 screwing up and the plant starts getting out of -- the 10 11 water levels in the generator get too high. They lose 12 startup feedwater. Eventually they get an S signal because the pressure goes low because they're not 13 14 getting makeup anymore from the CVS, and then they get 15 an S signal. they should get into emergency 16 Now, 17 procedures then. They shouldn't just go run off and Again, operators can make errors of 18 isolate it. 19 commission. If they make enough of them, you can get 20 into trouble initially. This event in that situation 21 would take a while because it doesn't evolve rapidly. 22 DR. WALLIS: is the weakest part of this 23 whole thing the reliability of this S signal, 24 depending on the level? That's something a little bit

less than 100 percent reliable?

1 MR. CUMMINS: No, the S signal is part of the protection system, and it has got four divisions 2 3 independently sensed and then a vote, two out of four. 4 So it's as reliable as you can get in current plants. 5 DR. WALLIS: That's why it has got four division. 6 7 MR. CUMMINS: Right. MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, and it's actually the 8 9 main input. There is a pressurizer low level that 10 will start it. There's also a pressurizer pressure 11 which will start it. 12 Diverse actuation system also comes into play to start core makeup tanks, passive RHR. 13 14 won't automatically kick in ADS, but it does provide 15 some level of backup. DR. WALLIS: I think you're going to take 16 twice your allotted time here. 17 18 MR. SCHULZ: The PRA, you see the summary, 19 the numbers here for core damage frequency, large 20 release frequency, at power, shutdowns, based on internal events, floods and fires compared to the 21 22 safety goals. 23 And we think that not only just from the 24 numbers, but from the sensitivity studies that we've 25 done that we have a very robust design. It ha lots of

1 margin and relatively little uncertainty, and a lot of 2 that goes back to the passive systems are simply. 3 There's not a lot to model. There's not a lot that 4 can go wrong. 5 You don't have the complex network of systems that start from AC power, cooling water 6 7 systems, HVAC systems that go all the way up through your front line pumps and fans and whatever that you 8 9 have in the current plants. 10 MR. ROSEN: These are very interesting 11 results. They first show something that we've 12 suspected for some time in operating plants, that risk during shutdown is comparable to the risk during 13 14 operation, and we show that again here, two or E to 15 the minus seven in both cases. 16 MR. SCHULZ: Yeah. 17 MR. ROSEN: And the other thing it shows is something else we've suspected all along, is that 18 19 important both during operation are 20 shutdown, and that you show again here, and in fact, 21 important than shutdown you show more 22 I mean it's a higher risk. operation. 23 I'd be interested if you could off the top 24 of your head tell me why, but it's really just

perverse curiosity.

1 MR. SCHULZ: I'd say first that the 2 shutdown internal events is --3 MR. ROSEN: The fire number. 4 MR. SCHULZ: I understand. I just wanted to say something about -- because you had commented on 5 both. 6 7 This number is calculated in a very similar way than the at power, which is kind of unique 8 9 to this plant design, which doesn't rely on shutdown systems to provide the safety. We still have -- a 10 11 shutdown cooling system is still a non-safety system. 12 Okay? So we always have passive features that provide the bulk of the core melt protection, and so we don't 13 14 have to rely on trying to anticipate maintenance 15 outages and having taken part of your protection out of service during a shutdown. 16 17 So it's a lot simpler and probably less uncertainty in the shutdown number here. When you do 18 19 that with an operating plant, it's a lot more 20 difficult, and it's probably more uncertainty in terms 21 in-service testing, inspection, know, 22 maintenance. 23 Now, internal fires, these numbers are not 24 calculated with the same level of detail as the

internal events. In order to simplify the analysis,

1 we ended up making it more conservative, and so I 2 think these numbers are not as comparable in terms of 3 their accuracy. It's more of a conservative number, 4 but they're a little bit higher than we would think 5 they would really be. So I think your statement may be misled or 6 7 we may be misleading you a little bit by showing these 8 numbers that are more comparable and you saying that 9 fire is important. And what we're saying is that these are conservative numbers, more conservative than 10 11 these numbers just because of the simplifications we 12 did in doing the fire PRA. Well, I was specifically 13 MR. ROSEN: 14 commenting on the fact that the shutdown fire core 15 damage frequency is higher than your at power. 16 MR. SCHULZ: No, it's not. Eight E to the minus --17 MR. ROSEN: Eight, minus eight though. 18 MR. SCHULZ: 19 MR. ROSEN: Yeah, versus five E to the 20 minus eight. 21 MR. SCHULZ: Oh, okay. You're comparing 22 this. Yes, yes. 23 MR. ROSEN: And that was the -- I believe 24 that because I think at least in current operating 25 plants there's a lot more going on in shutdown.

1	are a lot more people there. Fires, you know, are
2	more likely.
3	MR. SCHULZ: What tends to happen to
4	AP1000 is that when you start looking at those levels
5	of defense, when you look at shutdown, you have fewer
6	levels of defense involved, and that's what tends
7	to even though you're there less often so the
8	initiating event challenges are lower, you also have
9	less protection.
LO	MR. ROSEN: You're there less often for a
L1	shorter duration of time than you are at power.
L2	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
L3	MR. SIEBER: Do you have a seismic CDF in
L4	WHARF (phonetic)?
L5	MR. SCHULZ: No. The seismic was done on
L6	a seismic margins basis.
L7	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
L8	MR. SCHULZ: We looked at, I think, .5 G.
L9	MR. SIEBER: And so that's not included in
20	your final number?
21	MR. SCHULZ: That's not. Seismic is not
22	in there, right.
23	And at risk of showing the in-vessel
24	retention picture, I wanted to at least go through the
25	different things that are in the design that relate to

1	severe accidents and capability. Obviously core
2	competent interaction, the in-vessel retention is a
3	feature that minimizes, reduces that importance.
4	We've done testing analysis for both AP600 and AP1000.
5	For AP1000, we improved the shape of the
6	insulation. In AP600 there was more of a cone shape
7	down here, which was less effective at promoting the
8	actual circulation and cooling of the lower head than
9	the hemispherical head that we now have. And this was
LO	one of the things that we tested for AP1000.
L1	High pressure core melt is dealt with by
L2	the highly reliable ADS which has
L3	DR. WALLIS: You do have instrument
L4	penetrations in the bottom of this vessel?
L5	MR. SCHULZ: No.
L6	DR. WALLIS: Nothing at all?
L7	MR. SCHULZ: No.
L8	MR. SIEBER: No.
L9	MR. SCHULZ: High temperature core melt is
20	reduced greatly in probability because of the highly
21	redundant, diverse ADS system. You know, ADS-1, 2, 3
22	or 4, all or any of those are sufficient to get you
23	down low enough in pressure to prevent a high pressure
24	core melt.
25	Hydrogen burn detonation is dealt with by
	I and the state of

1	arrangement of the containment, where we put vents on
2	the IWST to keep potential hydrogen flames from
3	damaging the containment shell, as well as by the fact
4	that we have redundant, diverse igniters/pourers
5	(phonetic) in there.
6	Ex vessel steam explosions. Again, heat
7	being the core in the vessel would prevent that, and
8	we've also, as you heard, I think, the last time we
9	talked about containment integrity even if IDR fails.
10	DR. RANSOM: The vessel insulation, is
11	that on multiple shields, too?
12	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
13	DR. RANSOM: What material is that made
14	out of?
15	MR. SCHULZ: Stainless steel.
16	DR. RANSOM: And how many layers or how
17	thick is each layer?
18	MR. SCHULZ: They're like foil. so
19	they're very thin.
20	DR. RANSOM: Very thin.
21	MR. SCHULZ: The interior layers. Now,
22	there's an inside layer which is heavier and an
23	outside layer which is heavier for handling purposes.
24	DR. RANSOM: So they're a jacket that's
25	made and installed.

1	MR. SCHULZ: Yes, yes. It has to be, you
2	know, fit to the
3	DR. RANSOM: Are they evacuated also?
4	MR. SCHULZ: No.
5	DR. RANSOM: No. Are they filled with
6	argon?
7	MR. SCHULZ: No, just air. They're not
8	sealed.
9	DR. WALLIS: No, they're filled with Oak
10	Ridge actually.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. ROSEN: I assume they're probably
13	dimpled or something so there is a means of creating
14	an air gap between the layers.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, they're spaced.
16	MR. SIEBER: I don't recall that.
17	MR. ROSEN: Pardon?
18	MR. SCHULZ: The samples
19	MS. CUMMINS: You can't see the on the
20	outside you see a box which looks like a stainless
21	steel box, and on the inside are all of these foils.
22	CHAIRMAN KRESS: They generally have
23	spacers, shims.
24	MR. SIEBER: They are not a precision kind
25	of a thing.
ļ	I and the state of

1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: No.
2	DR. RANSOM: Well, I assume that they're
3	at least made so that, you know, the gap provides some
4	resistance to conduction.
5	CHAIRMAN KRESS: That's true.
6	MR. SIEBER: Well, the joints, you have
7	conduction all the way through. So they get
8	MR. SCHULZ: And leakage. You take a
9	little bit of a hit here from insulation effectiveness
10	point of view. So you have to account for that and
11	the normal heat loads in containment are a little bit
12	greater with this kind of insulation.
13	DR. RANSOM: Have you ever brought a
14	sample of that here?
15	MR. SCHULZ: No. I have one sitting on my
16	desk back in Pittsburgh.
17	MR. SIEBER: It's the same as what they
18	use in plants today.
19	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah.
20	DR. RANSOM: Today?
21	MR. SIEBER: Yeah.
22	MR. SCHULZ: It's not new.
23	MR. SIEBER: It takes a bunch of sections
24	and you strap them all together.
25	MR. CUMMINS: You buckle them together,

1	and you have to take them off if you want to inspect
2	the pipe, and it's kind of a pain actually. That's
3	why people start using the other stuff.
4	DR. RANSOM: So if these are ripped off by
5	the discharge from an ADS valve, why, they're just big
6	chunks.
7	MR. SIEBER: Then you've got a bunch of
8	boxes on the floor.
9	MR. CUMMINS: Yeah, it's stainless steel
10	pieces.
11	MR. SIEBER: A bunch of boxes on the
12	floor.
13	MR. SCHULZ: The next couple of slides
14	deal with some structural considerations. This is
15	pretty much a list of the main structural changes to
16	the AP1000. As I mentioned the containment shell, as
17	well as the containment vessel, were raised about 25
18	and a half feet.
19	DR. WALLIS: Only on the top, right?
20	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, the top part. Down
21	here was not changed, but basically inserted a ring in
22	both the steel shell and the concrete that was 25 and
23	a half feet.
24	The PCS capacity was increased about 50
25	percent, and that's this water storage up here. Now,

that's less than the containment or the core increase, and we did a couple of things there to minimize the increase. One of them is that we didn't have to increase the flow rate in the first several hours because that was based more on establishing a water film quickly and the flow rate was high enough to still reduce the containment pressure. So that didn't have to be increased. So that didn't contribute to water flow or water volume increase.

The other thing was that AP600 originally was designed to try to go seven days with water instead of three days, but we basically didn't have enough water left over after three days to provide sufficient cooling. So we tried to do something and we ended up not really pulling it off.

So we ended up deciding with this AP1000 we're just going to use that extra water in the first three days. So that also reduced the amount of increase that we needed in the tank volume, and at the end of three days this tank would be empty.

Now, of course, there is still the ancillary water storage tank that we have provided and ancillary pumps that can refill that, plus the fire connections and all of that.

MR. ROSEN: Now, these valves that Jack

1	Sieber was worried about earlier, you can show us
2	where they are?
3	MR. SIEBER: There's the spares right
4	there.
5	MR. SCHULZ: There's a little room that's
6	depicted here. Here' stairs that are inside the
7	concrete, and then outside. I think this is actually
8	part of the covered access up to this side of the
9	containment. It's on the outside of the concrete.
10	So from here down you're outside the
11	concrete, and then you have to transition in to get to
12	that room.
13	MR. ROSEN: And where are those valves
14	right there in that?
15	MR. SCHULZ: They're right there in this
16	room so that the lines come down from the tank into
17	this room and then go over to the top of the
18	containment.
19	MR. SIEBER: And the containment there is
20	about an inch and a half thick, the steel part.
21	MR. CUMMINS: Inch and three-quarters.
22	MR. SCHULZ: And three-quarters. It's
23	slightly thicker than AP600, and then I think the next
24	slide actually shows it.
25	DR. SHACK: And it's a higher strength

1	steel, too.
2	MR. SCHULZ: Right.
3	MR. SIEBER: But from a radiation
4	shielding point of view, it's almost transparent.
5	MR. SCHULZ: The air inlets up at the top
6	here were reconfigured in shape, this same area, and
7	the reconfiguration was to allow for a stronger
8	connection between the dome and the side wall.
9	The polar pane was raised and facet
10	increased because of the larger steam generators.
11	Obviously the reactor vessel gets a little bit longer.
12	Steam generators are bigger. The concrete walls
13	around the steam generators were raised because the U
14	tubes were raised, and the pressurizer height was
15	raised because of volume changes.
16	And the only thing out in the auxiliary
17	building that changed was the lowering of the spent
18	fuel pit floor because we have longer fuel.
19	CHAIRMAN KRESS: You had to change out
20	those steam generators. Did you have to cut a hole
21	through the containment?
22	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah. It would go up through
23	the center here. It would move this concrete shield
24	and the screens that are in here, and if you cut a

hole in the steel and then $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$

1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Pulled it right up there.
2	MR. SCHULZ: pull it right up there,
3	right.
4	MR. SIEBER: That's one way. You don't
5	have room enough to turn it inside.
6	MR. CUMMINS: I think we do, but we
7	haven't finished that study.
8	MR. SIEBER: You have to cut the moisture
9	separator off to do that.
10	MR. SCHULZ: This shows you the steel
11	containment vessel. The same diameter as AP600.
12	Again, it's 25 or so feet longer. Here's the
13	different material we're using. Design pressure went
14	up from 45 to 59 psi, the same design pressure, and we
15	have some external pressure capability to deal with.
16	DR. WALLIS: But you never pull a vacuum
17	in there, do you?
18	MR. SCHULZ: We've tried hard to see if we
19	could, and basically the limiting case is if you have
20	very, very cold weather and you lose your heating.
21	Then the cold weather will tend to pull the
22	containment down, and if you're starting at
23	atmospheric pressure, you will drift into a mild
24	vacuum.
25	There is no spray system. Turning water

1 on with cold weather actually helps because the water 2 is warmer than the air. 3 The seismic design basis, the main point 4 here is that both AP600 and AP1000 have a response 5 spectrum that's amplified at high frequencies to cover -- to bound off the reg. guide. 6 7 CHAIRMAN KRESS: Is this a limitation on 8 the site you can use? The hard rock is 9 MR. CUMMINS: the 10 limitation on the sites you can use. I think the 11 current sites, maybe 30 percent are hard rocks, and 12 this was a decision to expedite the process because the soft soil analysis is long and expensive, and we 13 14 ultimately will expand to soft soil sites and do that 15 analysis, but it's not in design cert. I was wondering if you 16 CHAIRMAN KRESS: 17 could sell one to Japan with that limitation. MR. CUMMINS: Well, the .2 G is probably 18 19 not sufficient for Japan. 20 MR. ROSEN: So you're limited to .3 G with a hard rock foundation for now. 21 MR. SIEBER: 22 But there's still room for additional analysis. 23 24 MR. CUMMINS: Yes, you can expand that. 25 lots of There's question. Ιt just takes no

1 engineering hours. What we're going to expand it to 2 is to the utility requirements document set of soil 3 conditions which bounded I think it was 80 percent of 4 U.S. sites. 5 MR. SIEBER: And for non-hard rock sites, it doesn't really pay you to do a generic analysis 6 because soil liquefaction and all of that differs from 7 8 site to site. MR. SCHULZ: The last couple of slides are 9 basically summarizing some of the other features of 10 11 the design. I had mentioned great simplifications of 12 the design. Here you see some numbers in terms of your reduction in safety related valves. This is just 13 14 total numbers of pumps, safety related piping, 83 15 percent less, again, with a great simplification in not having pumps outside containment, multiple headers 16 inside containment. 17 The cable reductions are mainly with 18 19 multiplexing and digital I&C, as well as having fewer 20 valves and pumps and thing. This all ends up translating into smaller buildings, especially the 21 22 seismic buildings. 23 This gives you sort of a graphical picture

of how much smaller the footprint is, and the colored

parts are the safety related stuff that's train

24

1	oriented and whatever. This is actually Seiswell,
2	which is sort of advanced evolutionary type design
3	with four trains. So with four diesels, and it's
4	probably a little bigger than most operating plants,
5	but not too different from where you'd end up with an
6	evolutionary advanced design.
7	MR. SIEBER: When you did the civil
8	layout, did you take into account providing sufficient
9	space to maintain the equipment?
10	MR. SCHULZ: We had a lot of help back in
11	AP600 from U.S. utilities. We had a handful of guys
12	sitting in our building helping us to make sure we had
13	laid on space. There were reviews done, and the EPRI
14	requirements are pretty strong in that area.
15	So we didn't make the plant smaller
16	because we chinced on maintenance and lay-down space.
17	MR. SIEBER: Well, that was the practice
18	in the middle to late '60s and early '70s. You know,
19	let's make it smaller, smaller, smaller until you
20	couldn't work on the heat exchanger, couldn't retube
21	anything. You know, it was always a big adventure.
22	So I hope that that mistake wasn't made
23	here.
24	MR. SCHULZ: Well, we think not. We've
25	done a lot of things in terms of

1 MR. SIEBER: Well, you've thought about it 2 at least. 3 MR. SCHULZ: Installed platforms, where 4 things are located so that you don't have to put 5 scaffolding up. MR. SIEBER: Right. 6 7 MR. SCHULZ: All that kind of stuff. 8 MR. SIEBER: Okay. Good. We've done a lot of work in 9 MR. SCHULZ: the general arrangement. AP1000 is the same as AP600. 10 11 Separation of radioactive/nonradioactive areas out in 12 the AUX building; fire separation even in containment. We obviously can't put wall barriers up per se, but we 13 14 try to do some innovative things. 15 We're having two trains above the operating deck and two trains below the operating deck 16 17 as the primary routing to get some separation. especially 18 Safety/non-safety, again, outside 19 containment. 20 Here's your maintenance inspection. We've 21 also added access areas and staging areas right 22 outside of the main operating deck out into an annex 23 building out here. So right before refuelings, you 24 can get everything all ready here to go in a nice, big

space.

1	You also have some storage space out here
2	so that you don't have to keep you're not tempted
3	to keep tools and fixtures and things inside
4	containment which can end up being debris in an
5	accident.
6	The access to the containment, we have
7	basically two equipment batch kind of things, one at
8	the operating deck and one at the main level below the
9	operating deck so that we can get stuff in and out
LO	easier and quicker during fuelings.
L1	MR. SIEBER: But those are both inside the
L2	aux. building?
L3	MR. SCHULZ: That's right. They're both
L4	covered by you can see here safety related structures.
L5	Now, there is another building out here, which is a
L6	non-safety related structure. It's still a radiation
L7	controlled environment.
L8	MR. SIEBER: Having one equipment hatch
L9	outside was a convenience for moving material in and
20	out.
21	MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins.
22	The utility requirements document
23	prevented that.
24	MR. SIEBER: Oh, okay.
25	MR. SCHULZ: Yeah, that was their

1 MR. SIEBER: They didn't want it. 2 MR. SCHULZ: Now, the lower one you can 3 get a truck up from grade to that door. So we have 4 some pretty easy access to that one, but they wanted 5 to get through the building. Well, okay. It's 6 MR. SIEBER: Yeah. 7 still easier to rig and lift on the outside rather than inside some building someplace, but whatever the 8 9 customer wants, I guess. 10 (Laughter.) 11 MR. SCHULZ: That's what we were working 12 on. Improved construction methods. The first 13 14 thing, of course, is simplifying, reducing what you 15 have to build. Another main thing was use of modularization, extensive use. You see here sort of 16 17 an outline. The main module inside containment with 18 19 the steam, two-loop compartments, the refueling canal, 20 underneath, reactor cavity the pressurizer 21 compartment. 22 That thing will be put together by steel 23 You see these lines here are panels that panels. 24 would be factory fabricated, shipped to the site and then welded together in this large module outside of 25

1 containment, and then the whole thing lifted inside 2 containment. That kind of construction we think will 3 add to the quality as well as to the speed of 4 construction. We've done a lot of work on construction 5 schedule including what we call 4D modeling using our 6 7 3D computer model of the plant coupled with time in a construction kind of mode to see how the plant goes 8 9 together. You know this story probably better than 10 11 we do. We've been successful with maintaining our 12 schedule, and we just have a few steps to important steps though. 13 14 This is just a summary. We think that 15 AP1000 meets with some comfort the NRC and industry standard, both deterministic and probabilistic, and 16 that the final design approval is an important step in 17 our journey. 18 DR. WALLIS: Tell us the status for future 19 20 There are not any future standards though. plants. 21 You don't know what they're going to be. 22 MR. SCHULZ: No. 23 DR. WALLIS: So these are really existing 24 standards. MR. SCHULZ: Existing standards, yes. 25

the extent that they do exist for
DR. WALLIS: For light water reactors.
MR. SCHULZ: light water reactors and
for new plants.
MR. ROSEN: This picture raises a question
in my mind, which may be better addressed on Slide 18.
Could you go back to that one?
Yeah. Where is the grade in this? Oh,
that's it. Okay.
Could it be deeper? Could you sink this
whole thing deeper?
MR. SIEBER: Sure.
MR. ROSEN: I mean, is there any reason
that the grade needs to be at that point?
MR. SIEBER: You just have a little stack
coming out of the ground.
MR. ROSEN: Well, that's where the access
is, right?
MR. CUMMINS: Yeah. Maybe if you started
all over again you could have it, but at this stage
you have a lot invested in the access and all the
other arrangements on how you got any piece of
equipment out for repair. You couldn't have the whole
thing underground because you have to have air
cooling, but you could have had a design philosophy of

1	more underground, but the studies done by the industry
2	in probably the '80s assessed that underground
3	construction was much more expensive and difficult
4	than above ground, and all of the recommendations from
5	these DOE sponsored constructability things said that
6	it would be good to minimize underground.
7	Of course, we have a little bit different
8	environment now, but
9	DR. WALLIS: But what the underground is
10	the core is essentially underground and the spent fuel
11	pool is
12	MR. CUMMINS: Yeah, there's two floors of
13	the auxiliary building underground, but I don't think
14	that that gives you much because the steam generators
15	aren't. So we don't claim any security benefit from
16	that.
17	MR. ROSEN: Where is the fuel pool on this
18	one now?
19	MR. SIEBER: It's out there.
20	MR. ROSEN: But where? But relative to
21	grade?
22	MR. SCHULZ: See, this is operating deck
23	here.
24	MR. CUMMINS: I believe that the top of
25	the fuel pool is 135 and grade is 100. So maybe the

1 fuel is -- I don't exactly know -- maybe the fuel is 2 below, but there's a lot of water above. 3 MR. SCHULZ: Another thing to consider in 4 our design, we did wind tunnel testing to make sure 5 that the air inlets and the air exhaust were not perturbed by air flow over the turbine building or 6 7 nearby hills. If you started lowering the containment I don't know what would happen to such interactions. 8 9 MR. SIEBER: It would lower everything. 10 MR. SCHULZ: The hills? 11 MR. SIEBER: Office buildings, turbine. 12 Yeah, I see. If you lower MR. SCHULZ: the --13 14 MR. SIEBER: All you'll have is that 15 little stack at the top that's coming out of the 16 ground. 17 CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay. I guess at this time would be a good time to take a break. 18 So I'll 19 declare a break until 10:30, and then we'll come back. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 20 21 the record at 10:12 a.m. and went back on 22 the record at 10:30 a.m.) 23 Okay. I guess on the CHAIRMAN KRESS: 24 agenda we're at the place where the staff is going 25 into take over. Are you ready, John?

1	MR. SEGALA: I'm just recovering from a
2	cold. So you'll have to bear with my voice here.
3	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Just don't breathe on us.
4	MR. SEGALA: That's all right. I think
5	I'm better. I just have the residual at this point.
6	MR. SIEBER: What's important is are you
7	contagious.
8	MR. SEGALA: I have no idea.
9	MR. SIEBER: I may move over.
10	(Laughter.)
11	MR. SEGALA: There are some open seats
12	over there.
13	MR. SIEBER: In the middle.
14	MR. SEGALA: Well, I'm John Segala. I'm
15	the lead project manager for the AP1000 design
16	certification review.
17	The other project managers are Joe
18	Colaccino. He's stepped out for a minute. Steve
19	Bloom and Lauren Quinones over there.
20	What we did here was we went back to the
21	previous Future Plant Design Subcommittee meeting in
22	Pittsburgh and worked off of what we presented at that
23	meeting and developed an update package for you for
24	this meeting.
25	So the purpose is to provide a summary of
·	

1 our review and the current status of the project; 2 discuss major milestones and successes that 3 understand what we reviewed and how we resolved it; 4 and current status of future milestones. 5 CHAIRMAN KRESS: Success of your presentation is if we have these attributes; is 6 7 that --8 MR. SEGALA: Yes, yes. And you'll see 9 some more attributes as we go down. 10 So because of time constrained I put both earlier presentation and later presentation 11 mу 12 together. So this will actually be two mini presentations. 13 14 Just really quick, March 2002 we completed 15 a pre-application review. Westinghouse submitted their design certification application March 28th. On 16 June 25th, NRC accepted the application. June 16th we 17 issued a DSER with 174 open items. 18 19 On May 18th, we responded to your interim 20 letter that we received, and on May 25th, we sent you 21 an advanced copy of the FSER. 22 This slide just points out how many ACRS 23 meetings we've had. A total of 18, including today's 24 meeting. We'll have one more meeting in July for the

full committee, and so that will be 19.

1	Although we did a complete review for
2	AP1000, if you go back to AP600, there were 44 ACRS
3	meetings, which that all sort of builds together.
4	The remaining milestones, July 7th, full
5	committee meeting which I mentioned before. This July
6	17th sort of forward looking at we're requesting that
7	that's when you could get us a letter by in order for
8	us to meet the future milestones.
9	The division director
10	CHAIRMAN KRESS: How come it isn't that
11	the slash on that approval, say, slash, discipline?
12	MR. SEGALA: Well, we're being optimistic.
13	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Oh, okay.
14	MR. SEGALA: August 6th, where you have to
15	get
16	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Excuse me for that.
17	PARTICIPANT: You had our heart beating.
18	DR. WALLIS: From the point of view of
19	punctuation, is there one or two or ten directors
20	involved and is there an apostrophe somewhere in
21	there?
22	MR. SEGALA: There's four division
23	directors.
24	DR. WALLIS: So there's an apostrophe
25	after the S.

1	MR. SEGALA: Yeah.
2	DR. WALLIS: Okay. Thank you.
3	MR. SEGALA: August 13th, OGC, no legal
4	objection.
5	August 30th, EDO memo to the Commission,
6	and then on September 13th, we issue the FSER and FDA.
7	And December 2005 is our current schedule
8	for the final design certification rulemaking,
9	although we've committed to reassess the schedule and
10	discuss that when we issue the FSER.
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Are you trying to move it
12	up?
13	MR. SEGALA: Yeah. We're looking at
14	whether we can do that or not.
15	This is just to give you an idea of the
16	resources that we've put towards this review. This is
17	a total of 88 technical reviewers as well as project
18	managers that have worked on both the draft SER and
19	FSER.
20	It also shows you that I couldn't have all
21	of these people here today to answer your questions.
22	So if things come up that I don't know the answer to
23	we'll try and get back to you.
24	As well as the reviewers, these are the
25	contractors we've had supporting our review.

1	Just really quick, we had 742 RAIs as
2	compared to 7,000 RAIs for AP600. This just gives you
3	a general idea of what areas the RAIs fell into. The
4	significant number of RAIs doesn't necessarily mean
5	anything. The individual items may be significant
6	even though you may only have a few of them.
7	We issued the DSER on June 16th, 174 open
8	items in it, and in ten months we got that down to
9	resolving all of the open items, and then when
10	Westinghouse issued their Rev. 11 of the DCD, that
11	allowed us to confirm all of the open items.
12	DR. WALLIS: It's interesting not items
13	appeared between 6/16/03 and
14	MR. SEGALA: Well, I'm about to get to
15	that.
16	DR. WALLIS: Oh, there are some new items
17	which aren't shown here.
18	MR. SEGALA: There are some new items.
19	DR. WALLIS: Oh, okay.
20	MR. SEGALA: This doesn't show that.
21	DR. WALLIS: Thank you.
22	MR. SEGALA: Seven hundred I went
23	backwards. Am I still going backwards?
24	MR. SIEBER: There you go.
25	MR. SEGALA: Okay. One hundred seventy-

1	four open items as compared to 1,300 for AP600. We
2	issued five new open items after the DSER was issued.
3	Four of those were related to materials that were
4	brought up at the Future Plant Subcommittee meeting in
5	Pittsburgh, and one was brought up on sumps.
6	And we have a slide in a little while that
7	you'll see that will discuss those.
8	Design acceptance criteria, these are
9	typically limited to those areas that are affected by
10	rapidly changing technologies or design areas which as
11	builts or as procured information is not available,
12	and for AP1000 we've I&C, human factors, control rooms
13	design, and piping.
14	CHAIRMAN KRESS: There was some debate
15	about the piping early on.
16	MR. SEGALA: Yeah, piping was not
17	originally approved. For AP600, they did the full
18	piping, but for AP1000 they proposed a DAK approach.
19	Exemptions. We had three exemptions for
20	AP1000, 5,034 for the safety parameter display.
21	Westinghouse asked for an exemption to have an
22	integrated safety parameter display system, rather
23	than having a separate, stand alone system how current
24	plants have.
25	And this is something that the staff found

1 acceptable, and I believe it's in our SRP that allows 2 them to do that. 3 For the ATWS requirements, Terry alluded 4 to this before. They asked for an exemption regarding 5 the requirement to have an aux. feedwater system, and they have a passive RHR system. 6 7 And then GDC 17 requires two independent off-site sources, and because Westinghouse doesn't 8 9 rely on that, that we gave them an exemption on that. So this was my first conclusion Okay. 10 11 remarks, was all open items resolved. We believe all 12 ACRS issues are addressed, but that remains to be seen, and we're on schedule to issue the FSER on 13 14 September 13th. 15 I'11 And just seque into the next 16 presentation. 17 The purpose of this presentation is to give you a summary of the staff's review and 18 19 resolution of the open items, and to have you gain understanding of what we reviewed and how we resolved 20 21 it and get your agreement that the items are resolved. 22 This other slide you have seen before. 23 Back in the Future Plant Design 24 Subcommittee in Pittsburgh in July of '03, we had discussed with you the possibility of having some 25

1 supplemental DSER sections. We ended up completing 2 the review. For Chapter 21 we included the AP600 evaluation in in the AP1000 FSER, and for Chapter 3 4 14.2, we issued 28 additional open items. They're 5 sub-open items on the initial test program which we didn't review for the DSER. they're all resolved. 6 7 And for Section 13.6, 3.6, 3.4, and 3.3, we resolved all of the open items with that. 8 9 general because there were no remaining open items, we just included that in the final SER rather than issue 10 supplementals. 11 12 In Chapter 1 of the DSER, there were three open items that were sort of generic in nature. 13 14 was we had a check. The DSER was reviewed up to Rev. 15 3 of the DCD. We're now up to Rev. 12. So this open 16 item was to make sure that we reviewed the latest 17 revision of the DCD, and we don't expect any future technical changes at this point. 18 TRT Star information, that's information 19 20 that's locked down. They have to get staff approval 21 before they can make changes to that. 22 reviewed all of that and are happy with what's in the DCD for that. 23 24 Combined license action items, the staff

has reviewed them and found them acceptable.

For the post SER open items, the four were on materials, and one was on the sump screens. The first materials one is poor shroud susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking. Westinghouse provided a response to that item and stated that based on operational experience no inspections were required beyond ASME, and the staff agreed with that.

This item was no discussed in the FSER.

The next materials question was Alloy 52/152 weldment QA criteria. In Westinghouse's response, they proposed to use 100 percent volumetric examination of all partial penetration J groove welds in the vessel, and the staff found that acceptable, and that is discussed in the FSER.

High chromium nickel-based alloy susceptibility, a low temperature crack propagation was a third materials question, the new item that we asked. Westinghouse's response concluded that there were four conditions that were necessary for the occurrence of low temperature propagation: relative high concentrations of hydrogen in the environment and in the metal relatively low temperatures; the presence of a sharp cracked tip; the presence of loads which rise at a moderate rate to levels great enough to fail a flawed material.

1	Westinghouse looked at their conditions
2	and concluded that the occurrence of low temperature
3	crack propagation cannot take place in the AP1000
4	design, and the staff found that acceptable. That is
5	also discussed in the FSER.
6	MR. SIEBER: A quick question on the
7	course rep. In current PWRs, I don't recall there
8	being any shroud cracking in PWRs; is that correct?
9	It's BWRs that had the shroud cracking
10	problem as I recall it. Does anybody know?
11	MR. MITCHELL: Yes, this is Matthew
12	Mitchell, Acting Section Chief, Materials and Chemical
13	Engineering Branch.
14	I'm not aware of any occurrences of shroud
15	cracking in pressurized water reactor designs.
16	Certainly we have been very familiar with the
17	phenomena in boiling water reactor designs.
18	MR. SIEBER: Yeah, it seems to me there's
19	no stress. The shroud just sort of sits there, and so
20	it's not a structural member. It's just a flow
21	device.
22	MR. MITCHELL: Well, the stresses which
23	are attributable to causing the cracking of BWR design
24	generally tend to be welded to residual stresses.
25	MR. SIEBER: Right.

1 MR. MITCHELL: Which would also be true of 2 a welded shroud design in a PWR, but the chemical 3 environmental conditions are obviously much less 4 aggressive in a pressurized water reactor design. 5 MR. SIEBER: Okay. Thank you. And so it's no surprise that the staff 6 7 would agree tha these plants are not susceptible to 8 that? 9 MR. MITCHELL: Correct. 10 MR. SIEBER: Okay. 11 MR. SEGALA: The fourth materials new open 12 item was ADS Squib valve notch susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking. Westinghouse' response 13 14 stated that this sheer section designed to ASME code 15 and environment is not susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, and the staff agreed with that. 16 17 The next item on the sump screens, after the DSER was issued, we, the staff, issued Rev. 3 to 18 19 Req. Guide 1.82, and in there was a discussion on the 20 chemical effects precipitation that might form and 21 cloud up the screens. 22 The staff sent this concern to 23 Westinghouse and had them address it, and Westinghouse 24 added a COL action item to consider the generation of

chemical debris in an evaluation.

1	We'll talk a little bit more about the
2	sump screens.
3	MR. ROSEN: Before you get off there,
4	would you talk a little bit more about the first
5	bullet? What's the rationale? Is there some capsule
6	rationale you can give me why they feel it's not
7	susceptible? Is it materials, stress, environment
8	rationale? What is it?
9	I believe that it was the conditions for
10	that to happen.
11	MR. MITCHELL: Yeah, this is Matthew
12	Mitchell again.
13	I was not directly involved in that
14	particular issue, but I believe what I have heard is
15	that it's a relatively shallow notched design, not
16	likely to lead to a severe stress intensification for
17	the Squib valve design. Plus the material that's
18	being used has been not shown to be prevalent to
19	stress corrosion cracking in a PWR environment.
20	If the gentleman from Westinghouse could
21	refresh my memory as to what the material is on that,
22	I believe it's a low carbon stainless; is that
23	correct?
24	MR. CUMMINS: A 316 stainless steel.
25	MR. MITCHELL: Three, sixteen.

1 MR. SEGALA: The ITAAC for the plan are to assure that the as-built plant conforms with the 2 3 certified design. We had 35 ITAAC related open items. 4 Some of them proposed new ITAACs are changes to 5 existing ITAACs, and some of them are related to resolutions of other open items that we had in other 6 7 chapters. And to date all of those have been 8 resolved. 9 Quality assurance. There were five open 10 11 items in the DSER. The staff went out and did 12 inspections at OSU, as well as at Westinghouse. OSU they identified a notice of violation and two 13 14 nonconformances, and OSU corrected that and provided 15 a response and the staff found that acceptable. And at Westinghouse we had a notice of 16 17 nonconformance, and Westinghouse went out performed some audits of their vendors, and they 18 19 provided a response and the staff found that that was 20 acceptable. 21 Leak before break, we had two leak before 22 break open items. The issues included Alloy 690, 52, 23 152, susceptibility to pressurized water, stress 24 corrosion cracking. The results from the sensitivity

stress corrosion cracking,

studies

using

25

crack

1	morphologies indicate that that if margin exist in LBB
2	application.
3	Acceptability of Westinghouse's LBB
4	approach was another item. Westinghouse used a
5	combination of qualitative assessment and quantitative
6	evaluation to evaluate all AP1000 candidate, AP1000
7	LBB piping subsystems. That
8	DR. WALLIS: Getting back to the 690, 690
9	is the magic material, isn't it, which is much better
10	than the previous material? There's not much
11	experience with it yet in nuclear plants, or is there?
12	MR. SIEBER: There is.
13	DR. WALLIS: How much experience? There
14	is a lot of experience.
15	MR. SIEBER: Steam generator tubes.
16	DR. WALLIS: So there is a lot of
17	experience. So we have a really good basis for making
18	this evaluation.
19	MR. ROSEN: Well, we don't have a long
20	experience, but we have a lot recently. I think the
21	jury is still out on 690.
22	DR. WALLIS: Right. So if something comes
23	up, you'd just be alert if something comes up with
24	this material
25	MR. SEGALA: Yeah. Westinghouse did one

LBB analysis for the DVI-A subsystem, and then they did an assessment of the AP1000 LBB subsystems using the AP600 analyses and scaling factors for pipe diameters and response spectra against bounding analysis curves.

And Westinghouse considered in their LBB assessments statistically based material properties, more sensitive leakage detection capability, and inclusion of pipe whip restraints, and the staff concluded that this approach was acceptable, and all LBB issues are resolved.

Regarding the sump screen performance, there were six sump screen open items. They were related to debris loading of the IRWS screens and their recirculation screens, as well as debris through the reactor coolant system break.

All open items are resolved. The staff concludes that the screen design is acceptable based on what Terry discussed, how they increased the screen surface areas. They also put a cross-connect between the two sumps. So that was their containment recirc. screen redesign.

The screen designer is robust to prevent screen blockage. They have low flows and the plate over top of the screens help keep material away, and

1 the lack of fibrous insulation. 2 they have ITAAC which verify the location of the plates above the containment research sump 3 4 screens. There are screen surface areas. The bottom 5 of the containment research sump screens, how far they're located off the bottom of the containment, and 6 7 the type of insulation and the dry film density of the 8 coatings. 9 They also have two COL action items. They 10 have one regarding their cleanliness program, and one 11 performing an evaluation consistent with Revision 3 of 12 Req. Guide 1.82. MR. ROSEN: Which means they'll use the 13 14 NEC guidance or at some point they'll actually show as 15 all other existing PWRs are going to be showing that they can properly and adequately enter and maintain 16 17 recirc.? MR. SEGALA: Well, the staff has approved 18 19 this based on the current design, and we believe that 20 anything that might come out of this evaluation would 21 just require programmatic changes. 22 MR. ROSEN: Oh, so we don't have to do all 23 of the work we're doing unclogging research and all of 24 that. We can just ask you how to solve it. You seem

to have a state of knowledge that far exceeds the

1	industry's.
2	MR. SEGALA: Well, if it turns out down
3	the road well, let me turn it over.
4	MR. CULLISON: This is Dave Cullison from
5	the staff.
6	When we put in the Reg. Guide 182
7	evaluation, at the time that was basically what we
8	had, but the expectation is that the NEI methodology
9	expands on the information in Reg. Guide 182, and we
10	would expect that anybody doing an analysis would be
11	using an NRC approved methodology, which right now is
12	going to be the NEI methodology.
13	MR. ROSEN: So you feel you have enough of
14	a hook into the licensing of AP1000 that we can be
15	sure that there will be a full and thorough review of
16	the sump design that is analogous or equally complete
17	as is being done for operating PWRs?
18	MR. CULLISON: Yes, we do.
19	MR. ROSEN: What is that hook? I know
20	Westinghouse will do the right thing, but what is the
21	regulatory hammer? Where does it arise? I don't get
22	it.
23	MR. CULLISON: Well, we referenced the
24	Reg. Guide 1.82, which as I explained is the NEI
25	methodology is an expansion on that, but also, we're

going to continue to evaluate what comes out of GSI 191, and if more information comes out that makes us decide we need to revisit this, we can evaluate what that we've done for AP1000 and, if necessary, backfit them.

MR. ROSEN: Oh, that's what I was afraid of. So you would have to backfit this design rather than front fit, rather than put a condition in the license now that says you'll --

MR. SIEBER: Once you make it a COL item, doesn't that -- that's the hook, the regulatory hook that makes them comply with whatever requirements develop between now and when they --

MR. ROSEN: I hope so because I don't think that the answer is satisfactory. I would have to condition the ARS approval because I don't think that's adequate. I mean, to say that if this turns out that there's some substantial problem here that we will go to Westinghouse and argue backfit, I simply don't think that's appropriate. Certainly it's not appropriate for the operating plants. I mean, we're not doing that with the operating plants. It's not a backfit to say that they have to successfully say that they have to successfully execute recirc. That's their design basis.

1	MR. SEGALA: It's a compliance backfit.
2	MR. ROSEN: Compliance backfit.
3	MR. SEGALA: Compliance backfit, and that
4	would be the same, I mean that would be the same
5	approach that we would take for Westinghouse, but
6	DR. WALLIS: Your Appendix A requires the
7	sump screens to work, and so if you ask a licensee,
8	"Show me that your sump screens work," they have to
9	take into account all of this information and do an
10	analysis.
11	MR. ROSEN: I'm trying to make sure we
12	have the regulatory authority to not get into a
13	discussion of whether it's required for AP1000 or not.
14	I mean it is. It should be; it must be, and so I am
15	still a little bit confused with the terminology
16	that's being used here. I mean, it's a regulatory
17	point.
18	MR. WILSON: Jerry Wilson, NRR.
19	As I understand it, the staff is saying at
20	this point in time that the design that Westinghouse
21	has provided is acceptable and meets the regulations.
22	So this issue here in the COL action item
23	deals with operational and procedural matters that we
24	would do later on.
25	MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins. I think

that we have a COL item that says perform an analysis in accordance with this Reg. Guide 1.82 and satisfy the staff that that analysis is acceptable, and we see that and I think maybe the staff should describe what the regulatory process is, but we see that as an open item that we have yet to satisfy and that we must satisfy as we got to the COL stage.

MR. ROSEN: Well, I appreciate that, Ed. I think that's the right point, position to be on, but I'm still trying to figure out why the staff doesn't see it that way, why the staff is saying, "Well, no, we're just going to look at procedures, when in fact we're looking at designs for the operating plants and presumably we ought to be looking at it here, too, on the same basis. It's not a different issue.

Now, clearly AP1000 has a lot of advantages over the amounts to the operating plants because you come so late in the design, in the cycle of knowledge, core acquisition that you know what a lot of the issues are, and you've done things that clearly make the situation better, not less.

I still think we need some sort of -- I don't know -- maybe it's a condition on the license or something other than the staff saying we're going to require Westinghouse to show us the procedures.

1	Westinghouse is willing to go a lot beyond that.
2	They're saying that they're going to resolve the issue
3	just like the operating plants are.
4	I hope they will because that's the best
5	knowledge we will have based on all of the research
6	that's going on that will be built in.
7	CHAIRMAN KRESS: The operation plants will
8	have an option of using their risk informed approach,
9	which Westinghouse may very well take advantage of.
10	MR. ROSEN: Westinghouse will what?
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Could take advantage of.
12	MR. ROSEN: I would see no difference
13	between the way the Westinghouse Westinghouse
14	should have all of the flexibility that the operating
15	plants have, but in the same breath, one has to say
16	they have to do just as rigorous an analysis based on
17	the current research as the operating points, not some
18	there's no pass here. I'm not issuing any free
19	passes on this issue.
20	MR. CUMMINS: I think maybe we could take
21	an open item and bring the words of the COL item, and
22	I believe that the words of the COL item will satisfy
23	you,b ut I'm not positive.
24	MR. ROSEN: Maybe you could do that for
25	the full committee meeting because I could make a

1 point that what is Westinghouse's commitment, and 2 maybe the staff could take another look at that. 3 MR. SEGALA: With regard to structure 4 seismic design, the review methodology was based on 5 review of critical sections selected by the staff, and they were similar sections that were reviewed for 6 7 AP600. The design constraints which Terry discussed were a hard rock site and a fixed base model for 8 9 seismic analyses. There were 38 structural seismic related 10 open items. The major items included basemat uplift 11 12 and completion of the containment design. CHAIRMAN KRESS: But could you refresh my 13 14 memory on what the basemat uplift issue is? 15 MR. SEGALA: Goutam, do you want to? 16 DR. WALLIS: It's a rather strange failure 17 mechanism of something. It seems to be that something 18 lifted up into the containment, the bottom of 19 containment. MR. SIEBER: And then falls over. 20 21 MR. BAGCHI: This is Goutam Bagchi from 22 NRR. 23 The structural properties of the nuclear 24 island, particularly the height, extended height of 25 the shield building increased the and so on

1 susceptibility to overturning, and at safe shutdown 2 earthquake level, it is not a problem. 3 But at the margins level we reviewed the 4 potential for lifting of the corners of the basement 5 up, and that slapping down of that at another cycle of seismic motion could potentially produce high impact 6 7 and, therefore, difficulty in analyzing that condition, and as a result they made some changes. 8 9 They provided sheer connectors to the bottom of the steel containment, and there is still slight uplift, 10 11 but we have reviewed the calculations in detail, and 12 determined that it is acceptable.1 There was a detailed audit of actual 13 14 calculations. 15 MR. SIEBER: When you do the calculation for uplift, does that include an analysis of piping 16 17 that penetrates containment and goes to the auxiliary building to look for bending and stress and strain 18 effects? 19 20 MR. BAGCHI: Well, the whole building is 21 rather complex. It is a finite element model that was 22 used for the analysis, and everything is represented 23 there. 24 MR. SIEBER: Okay. 25 MR. BAGCHI: The masses are there. The

1	stiffness is. Interconnections, all of those things
2	are there.
3	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
4	MR. BAGCHI: The staff, along with all of
5	the consultants, reviewed over several days all of the
6	calculations that were done. I think this is as
7	thorough a review as I have done in my more than 30
8	years with the NRC.
9	MR. SEGALA: Okay. Thanks, Goutam.
10	I think that completes that slide.
11	Thermal hydraulics was an area that we
12	spent considerable effort on. There were five thermal
13	hydraulic ACRS meetings where we talked about all of
14	the thermal hydraulic codes and analysis that were
15	performed.
16	There were four thermal hydraulic related
17	DSER open items which spanned on
18	DR. WALLIS: Well, really they include
19	their result now. They did include.
20	MR. SEGALA: Did include, yes.
21	Liquid entrainment which included the hot
22	leg and upper plenum, course weld, long-term cooling
23	and blond precipitation. All of the open items are
24	resolved related to thermal hydraulic, and the staff
25	concludes that they meet 50.46.

1	For PRA, we had a PRA subcommittee meeting
2	in January of 2003. There were 24 PRA related pen
3	items, and thais lists some of the notable topics, PRA
4	input to design certification process, PRA input to
5	witness process, impact of uncertainties on PRA
6	results and conclusions, success criteria and thermal
7	hydraulic uncertainty, SAMDA evaluation, reactor
8	vessel insulation design and shutdown risk, and all of
9	those open items are resolved.
10	I now am going to turn over the
11	presentation to Michelle Hart to give her evaluation
12	of aerosol removal.
13	MS. HART: Okay. I'm Michelle Hart. I'm
14	from the NRR staff. I did the dosage estimate for the
15	AP1000. I also had help from Sandia labs and from
16	other members of the staff.
17	Westinghouse initially intended to use the
18	AP1000 removal rates for the AP1000 sign. We
19	questioned that concept, and they eventually performed
20	a best estimate analysis with the AP1000 thermal
21	hydraulics calculated by MAAP, and they used aerosol
22	mechanistic code STARNAUA.
23	And in that code credit was given for
24	gravitational settling, diffuser phoresis, and thermal

phoresis, and we accepted these mechanisms as removal,

1 but we questioned the actual calculational values that 2 they came up with. 3 CHAIRMAN KRESS: The MAAP thermal 4 hydraulic calculations, was that one sequence or a lot 5 of sequences. MS. HART: It is one particular sequence, 6 7 and in fact, it's the 3BE-1, the double ended line break of the DVI line, with the failure to activate 8 9 the intact train. CHAIRMAN KRESS: Was that risk dominance 10 sequence? 11 12 MS. HART: It is risk dominance sequence. It's the one that -- in fact, it's the one that is the 13 14 dominant contributor to CDF for the AP1000 design. 15 Also, those thermal hydraulic conditions are typical for the majority of the sever accident 16 sequences, the 3DE class, fully depressurized and 17 reflooded, and as they used the alternative source 18 19 term reg. guide that we had written for the current 20 operating plants which implements NUREG 1465, the 21 revised source term, and that's supposed 22 representative of low melt core melt accidents, which 23 is similar to the 3BE sequence. 24 CHAIRMAN KRESS: How did they synchronize 25 the-- there was a timing in the source term.

MS. HART: Right.

CHAIRMAN KRESS: The timing in the thermal hydraulics, how did they synchronize that?

MS. HART: Right. During the course of -we had several discussions with Westinghouse over
these issues, and the way we had modeled it when we
did our independent analyses and we asked if they had
done it this way as well, and eventually they did do
it this way, is in the full integrated thermal
hydraulic analysis when it shows that you have the
release from the core, then because 1465 has that
timing aspect, that GAP release happens for 30
minutes, and then the core release happens for the one
and a half hours. You backed up 30 minutes from that
time that it shows in the thermal hydraulics, and
that's your start time for the overlaid, deterministic
source term.

We contracted with Sandia and did an independent analysis that was a Monte Carlo sampling using the melt core thermal hydraulics. We used our own thermal hydraulics for the same scenario, and used the aerosol deposition mode that is within MELCOR, which is the MAEROS model.

WE sampled on 13 parameters that would affect the aerosol parameters, and ran so many runs

1	that we would have a ninth-fifth confidence level, 95
2	percent confidence level.
3	Engineering judgment was used for the
4	choice of parameters and the distribution of those
5	parameters.
6	DR. WALLIS: What does "engineering
7	judgment" mean?
8	MS. HART: If we were not sure as to what
9	the actual distribution would look like, we did use
10	something that was skewed toward a more reasonable,
11	conservative value.
12	DR. WALLIS: That's better. That's a
	better statement.
13	better statement. MS. HART: Right.
13 14	
13 14 15	MS. HART: Right.
13 14 15 16	MS. HART: Right. CHAIRMAN KRESS: And in general, these
13 14 15 16	MS. HART: Right. CHAIRMAN KRESS: And in general, these parameters that you sample, you really do know
13 14 15 16 17	MS. HART: Right. CHAIRMAN KRESS: And in general, these parameters that you sample, you really do know something about the limits on a lot of those.
13 14 15 16 17 18	MS. HART: Right. CHAIRMAN KRESS: And in general, these parameters that you sample, you really do know something about the limits on a lot of those. MS. HART: Right. We understood the
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MS. HART: Right. CHAIRMAN KRESS: And in general, these parameters that you sample, you really do know something about the limits on a lot of those. MS. HART: Right. We understood the limits. If we didn't understand the behavior between
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MS. HART: Right. CHAIRMAN KRESS: And in general, these parameters that you sample, you really do know something about the limits on a lot of those. MS. HART: Right. We understood the limits. If we didn't understand the behavior between those limits, a lot of times we went with the uniformed distribution. Some of them are a normal distribution type.

1	shape factors, the aerosol size, and the
2	nonradioactive aerosol mass.
3	DR. WALLIS: By sample, do you mean these
4	varied randomly?
5	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Monte Carlo.
6	MS. HART: Yes. This is the total runs.
7	These are the results from each run varied over time.
8	The large spike at around three and a half hours or so
9	is dues to a hydrogen burn. We don't know why it's
10	such an enormous, obnoxious looking spike, but there
11	it is.
12	DR. WALLIS: Because if you average all of
13	the curves, you make the spike go away.
14	MS. HART: Exactly, and that is exactly
15	DR. WALLIS: But that's not the way to do
16	it though.
17	MS. HART: Well, there is some differences
18	in timing. We don't know if a hydrogen spike would
19	actually occur at that time. So you don't want to
20	take account of that in your removal.
21	DR. WALLIS: Yeah, but the last thing that
22	you want to do is average the curves to make the
23	spikes go away
24	CHAIRMAN KRESS: But I suspect the spikes
25	are good things here. You want them to go away. What

1	you're doing is increasing the thermal phoresis
2	problem.
3	MS. HART: Yes. And it just blows its
4	stuff over to the side, and so really it's a removal
5	mechanism that I mean you don't care if it goes away.
6	DR. WALLIS: It doesn't do much. For this
7	purpose, you don't care about the peaks.
8	CHAIRMAN KRESS: That's right.
9	DR. WALLIS: For other purposes you do.
10	MS. HART: For use in a dose calculation,
11	that is true. It would be conservative to not account
12	for that removal from that spike.
13	The late time values converge to around .3
14	per hour, and this is the uncertainty calculation, the
15	bounds that were given. We have the 80 through the
16	fifth percentile through the 80th percentile, and you
17	can see the median as well with the green line in the
18	center.
19	CHAIRMAN KRESS: For the elucidation of my
20	brethren, a lambda in this case is analogous to a
21	decay constant, related to the mass outborn in the
22	containment so that you know what we're talking about.
23	MS. HART: Right.
24	CHAIRMAN KRESS: In case you're not an
25	aerosol expert.

1	DR. WALLIS: Now, what you really care
2	about is the amount of decontamination interval over
3	the period of time presumably.
4	MS. HART: Over a particular period of
5	time. That is correct.
6	DR. WALLIS: So if you integrate the
7	individual curves and get the amount of
8	decontamination, does that give you the same result as
9	if you take the mean of these things and then
LO	integrate? That is not clear to me it does.
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: What you really do is
L2	have a race between airborne material being taken out
L3	and what's leaking out the containment.
L4	DR. WALLIS: No, I'm arguing about the
L5	treatment of statistical data.
L6	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Oh, oh.
L7	DR. WALLIS: Sometimes if you take the
L8	average and then use that as your mechanism you get a
L9	very different answer than if you take each curve and
20	integrate for each curve and then take the average of
21	that.
22	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Oh, yeah. I see what you
23	yeah, you're right.
24	DR. WALLIS: Sometimes you can really,
25	really mislead by taking an average and then using

1	that.
2	MS. HART: These curves were determined by
3	taking each time step and finding the competence level
4	for each of the
5	DR. WALLIS: But do you see what I mean?
6	I don't know if you appreciate what I mean. It is a
7	nonlinear process. If you do this, you may be
8	completely confusing the integrated effect of
9	decontamination.
10	CHAIRMAN KRESS: I think what he's talking
11	about is when Westinghouse goes to apply, they don't
12	use the full curve. They use a value of lambda.
13	MS. HART: They are using a value of
14	lambda that they had calculated for a specific
15	scenario.
16	DR. WALLIS: It's an average value?
17	MS. HART: I think it's an average for a
18	time period, but I'm not
19	MR. CUMMINS: This is a statistical
20	sampling overall of these parameters. They varied.
21	In our analysis we picked the set of parameters.
22	DR. WALLIS: What number did they pick
23	then? How do you compare what they do with what you
24	do?
25	MS. HART: We compared by performing a

1 dose analysis. We used our median lambdas that we 2 came up with from this curve. 3 DR. WALLIS: Is that the right thing to 4 do? 5 CHAIRMAN KRESS: No, w to be conservative with these lambdas, you want to bias things towards 6 7 the lower end. If you want to be conservative, you want a smaller lambda. 8 9 MS. HART: That is true. 10 We did not base our acceptance of their 11 dose calculations on their values for aerosol removal 12 coefficient. We wanted to do our own evaluation using the previous lambdas I had shown you, and we performed 13 14 an independent dose analysis. We used all other 15 parameters from the Westinghouse DCD except for we did use the medial aerosol removal coefficients. 16 There was some further averaging I did 17 have to do because of our calculational code. You can 18 19 only input an average lambda over a time step, and 20 there's only ten time steps that you can use. 21 DR. WALLIS: Did you try using one of your 22 -- well, I guess you can't -- or some of the actual Monte Carlo runs in calculating the decontamination 23 24 from them. It's a nonlinear process. MS. HART: 25 Right.

1 DR. WALLIS: And this averaging may not be 2 really averaging your integral effect. MS. HART: 3 I did do some sensitivity 4 calculations where I used one value for lambda of 5 around .4, and of course, with the atmospheric dispersion factors that Westinghouse had given us at 6 7 that time, that was not enough removal during the early phase to allow them to still be below the dose 8 9 acceptance criteria. However, they have changed their chi/Os in 10 11 the meantime, and I have not recalculated with the new 12 chi/O is. DR. WALLIS: Well, again, it seems to me 13 14 quite conceivable that although you get all of these 15 statistical variations in your Slide 38, if you actually took the original curves on Slide 37 and used 16 17 those to predict the amount of contamination, it might turn out they all predict the same amount because the 18 19 peaks are shifted and so on. And yet on the average, 20 it all comes to the same answer. 21 So there's no statistical variation in the 22 answer, and yet your 38 shows there's a bit 23 statistical variation. 24 CHAIRMAN KRESS: I think we're in design 25 basis space here.

1	MS. HART: That's correct.
2	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And what you have to
3	think of is this is accompanied by a rule on a
4	pressure and leak rate after containment , and that's
5	a bit artificial. They take a maximum pressure and
6	hold it for 24 hours and then drop it to one-half.
7	DR. WALLIS: You're on another
8	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And what the idea is is
9	to take what's in the containment during that period
10	and see what goes outside and see if you meet 10
11	CFR
12	DR. WALLIS: I understand that. I'm just
13	talking about the proper treatment of statistical
14	data.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: I understand.
16	DR. WALLIS: Bill Shack is nodding away.
17	He understands what I'm talking about.
18	CHAIRMAN KRESS: I understand. But
19	you're worried about decontamination, and what they're
20	worried about is how one gets out to the atmosphere.
21	DR. WALLIS: I'm just asking whether the
22	treatment is appropriate for these statistical
23	variations.
24	DR. SHACK: And since all of these time
25	histories aren't similar, you know, then when you

average at a given time value, you know, you're
averaging many it's just not clear, as Grant says,
what you've got when you're done.
MS. HART: Well, the thermal hydraulics
for each of those runs is exactly the same.
DR. WALLIS: Is that supposed to reassure
me?
MS. HART: Well, that has not varied for
all of those runs.
CHAIRMAN KRESS: Once again, what you're
interested in is not the decontamination, but what's
left airborne in the containment because that's what
leaks out, with a given constant leak rate and a given
constant pressure, so that this averaging
DR. WALLIS: Well, you see what I mean.
I mean, if you look at the figure 37, if it were true
that the curves which are high early are low later and
the curves which are low early are high later, it
could well be that the integrated decontamination for
all of these curves is about the same, and the way
that you average on 38 doesn't show that at all
MR. GOUNDER: Can I maybe offer some
clarification? My name is Randy Gounder, and I did
those calculations.
That family of curves that you see with

1	the decontamination coefficient, they all really vary
2	in the same pattern. They're not
3	DR. WALLIS: That helps a lot. Are they
4	not displaced in time?
5	MR. GOUNDER: They are not canceling each
6	other out if that's, I think, what you're
7	DR. WALLIS: Well, then if that's true, if
8	they all have the same sort of shape and they all have
9	the same sort of shape as the average curves on the
10	next figure, then we've got some reassurance that
11	there isn't a great distortion of what's going on.
12	MR. GOUNDER: That's in fact how they
13	behave.
14	DR. WALLIS: That helps.
15	MR. GOUNDER: And the big spike that you
16	see shows up in all of the analyses because they're
17	using the same governing thermal hydraulics.
18	DR. WALLIS: It's a very nonlinear thing
19	so that the spike contributes a huge amount to the
20	answer.
21	MR. GOUNDER: It's a very transient
22	DR. WALLIS: But it has disappeared when
23	you do the statistical averaging.
24	MR. GOUNDER: Right.
25	DR. WALLIS: Okay. So I think you

1	understand what I'm getting at. Thank you.
2	CHAIRMAN KRESS: But you're interested in
3	the worst two hours of this thing, and what you
4	actually need to be looking at is the airborne
5	concentrations, not the decontamination factors, over
6	the worst two hours, because you basically have a
7	constant leak rate during this time.
8	And I'll tell you for that worst two
9	hours, the shape of these curves are not going to
LO	affect it at all.
L1	DR. WALLIS: it doesn't make any
L2	difference?
L3	CHAIRMAN KRESS: It doesn't make any
L4	difference at all. It's somewhere during the front
L5	end of this thing, is the worst two hours.
L6	MS. HART: And you're still injecting
L7	source term at that time.
L8	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah. So really it
L9	doesn't make that much difference because we're in
20	design basis space. Where this kind of argument
21	you're talking about can make a big difference, if
22	you're transferring this type of thing and trying to
23	do severe accident, real severe accident analysis in
24	the PRA.
25	But when you do that, you're actually

1	using the full curve. You're using what the mean
2	curve is that comes out of the MAAP type code or the
3	MELCOR type code. So you don't average it. You just
4	use it as you go along.
5	So you're talking about two different
6	spaces.
7	MS. HART: Now, the only information we
8	use from this whole study is a removal lambda that
9	would be applied to an airborne concentration that is
10	determined in another way.
11	DR. WALLIS: So what do you use for
12	lambda?
13	MS. HART: I used varying lambdas. I used
14	the median lambdas, which would be the
15	DR. WALLIS: So it does vary.
16	MS. HART: It does vary, and I have to
17	time average it.
18	DR. WALLIS: And I guess my Chairman is
19	telling me it doesn't make any difference so I don't
20	need to worry.
21	CHAIRMAN KRESS: That's right.
22	DR. WALLIS: All right. Thank you.
23	(Laughter.)
24	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Its value makes some
25	difference.

1	MS. HART: Right.
2	DR. SHACK: Well, I take more comfort in
3	the fact that all of these things are so similar.
4	DR. WALLIS: And they're not displaced in
5	time because were they displaced in time the you
6	could, again Bill Shack knows what I'm talking
7	about.
8	MS. HART: Okay. So having done that,
9	even though we used different removal coefficients
10	than Westinghouse did, we also show that the doses are
11	below the dose criteria of 50.34 for off site and GDC-
12	19 for on site, the control room.
13	DR. WALLIS: Are they far below or just
14	below?
15	MS. HART: Westinghouse had back
16	calculated and used the chi/Qs that give them the
17	maximum dose for LOCA. So they are right at the
18	limits. My doses are somewhat below that because my
19	removal coefficients are different over the period of
20	time than theirs are.
21	DR. WALLIS: So they are right at the
22	limit?
23	MS. HART: They are right at the limit.
24	DR. WALLIS: So a slightly different
25	tweaking of the data might make them above the limit?

1 MR. CUMMINS: This is Ed Cummins. 2 This is really an issue of site 3 issue,a nd the chi/Q, which the 4 dispersion factor for the site, if you were us, you 5 would calculate the dose limit, the chi/Q that gave you exactly the limit because that would permit the 6 7 most sites to be. So any site with chi/Q less than what we needed in order to pass is acceptable, and if 8 you're over that, then you have to do all of this 9 10 assessment. 11 So, again, it's a rational thing for us to 12 do. DR. WALLIS: Well, you're always rational. 13 14 (Laughter.) 15 MR. SIEBER: You're trying to find the limiting condition. 16 17 Right, right. MS. HART: Exactly. This slide describes why we think the use 18 of the medium values is acceptable. 19 The traditional approach is the accepted bounding value, which in this 20 21 case would be at the lower end of those uncertainty 22 analysis like the fifth percentile. 23 We do believe it's acceptable for our 24 The median value is the least affected by the user's subjective judgment for the bounds and the 25

1 shape of those sample parameters. 2 We introduced that conservative bias I discussed earlier in the choice of those initial 3 4 conditions for those parameters and the shape of the 5 distribution. There's a precedence in the Perry AST case 6 7 where they used a median value for the steam line deposition, and that was based on other conservatisms 8 in the analysis, and our code requires yet another 9 averaging of those lambdas because of the constraints 10 11 of how the code is operating. 12 And the fully integrated MELCOR calculated rates are mostly well above the 13 14 percentile. That can be seen on this graph. 15 The four different code DR. WALLIS: predictions? It looks like thermal hydraulics. 16 17 MS. HART: It does, doesn't it? And in fact, it follows thermal hydraulics to some degree. 18 19 The smooth blue and orange curves are the thermal 20 hydraulics with -- I mean use the thermal hydraulics 21 either from MAAP or MELCOR, and it's the uncertainty 22 calculations that we're running with MELCOR, the Monte 23 Carlo calculations. The dark blue line is an ERI MELCOR run 24

that they had run with just the 3BE scenario, 3BE-1

1	scenario, and it's the full integrated, and those are
2	the removal that was calculated within MELCOR, and the
3	red line is our Westinghouse's numbers.
4	DR. WALLIS: This is what you call
5	reasonable agreement?
6	MR. SIEBER: Yeah.
7	MS. HART: I would say for our purposes,
8	yes, this is reasonable.
9	DR. WALLIS: For your purposes because you
10	only care about getting the decontamination
11	coefficient within 50 percent or something. Is that
12	the idea?
13	MS. HART: Right.
14	DR. WALLIS: Because the test of whether
15	the codes are doing a good job really doesn't look
16	very good.
17	MS. HART: No.
18	(Laughter.)
19	MR. SIEBER: It is like thermal
20	hydraulics.
21	DR. SHACK: They do go up and down.
22	(Laughter.)
23	MR. SIEBER: Sensitive to something
24	DR. WALLIS: Well, there's some strange
25	looking cliffs and things, but anyway, let's pass on.
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1	MS. HART: And that would be the end of my
2	presentation. Are there any further questions?
3	MR. SIEBER: Thank you.
4	MS. HART: Thank you.
5	MR. SEGALA: This is John Segala.
6	My last slide, all the open items were
7	resolved, and we're still on schedule.
8	After lunch today I have a presentation to
9	go over the interim letter issues. So we'll have
10	another shot at discussing some of these issues.
11	DR. WALLIS: So we have to wait until
12	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, we're ahead of
13	schedule.
14	DR. WALLIS: Can we move on with the next
15	slide? Are we not allowed to do that?
16	MR. SIEBER: It's a title slide.
17	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, that's generally a
18	no-no. We could do things like come back at 12:15
19	no, that wouldn't work either.
20	MR. SIEBER: Why would we do that?
21	MR. ROSEN: We could take a longer lunch
22	hour.
23	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, we could come back
24	at 12:30
25	MR. SIEBER: That would be good.

1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And start at 12:30 and
2	get ahead. That's not enough of a perturbation to
3	schedule that it hurts anything.
4	So why don't we do that? Break for lunch
5	and come back at 12:30 and start again at 12:30
б	instead of one.
7	DR. WALLIS: And what the NRC is going to
8	present is the rest of these transparencies?
9	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yes, sir, starting with
10	Item 5 there, and it's the rest of these
11	transparencies.
12	DR. WALLIS: Okay. Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay. I'll recess until
14	12:30.
15	(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the meeting was
16	recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 12:30 p.m., the
17	same day.)
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1	<u>AFTERNOON SESSION</u>
2	(12:31 p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Let's get started again,
4	please.
5	MR. SIEBER: Still feeling okay?
6	MR. SEGALA: Well, my voice is a little
7	bit more scratchy.
8	MR. SIEBER: You can sit down.
9	MR. SEGALA: I feel fine. I just can't
10	talk.
11	I'm John Segala again for the AP1000
12	design certification.
13	The purpose of this slide presentation is
14	to go over the interim letter issues that we received
15	from you.
16	This presentation is pretty similar to
17	what we gave you in the beginning of the month. We do
18	have some additional information regarding the organic
19	iodine.
20	Issue one was the ADS Squib valve
21	function. We had a slide on this this morning, and
22	Westinghouse talked about this, but I think in the
23	letter you agreed that an ITAAC assures the values
24	meet the design basis, and it has a simple design,

Section 3, Class I valve. It has redundant and

diverse actuation.

The staff did a PRA sensitivity study and it increased the failure probability to not change the PRA conclusions, and the ITAAC requires a type test, and it says that a test for type test of Squib valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions, and a test report concludes that the Squib valves change their position under design condition, and that the as installed Squib values are bounded by the testes or type tests.

For the screen blockage issue, the staff would like to propose -- I guess we had discussions earlier on this, and I think we'd like to have some internal meetings and give you a presentation at the full committee meeting in July if that would work for you.

CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay.

MR. SEGALA: Code deficiencies was an issue. This was during the thermal hydraulic review. The item was when deficiencies are found should the weaknesses be corrected, and I think both looking at the APEX AP1000 data we discovered deficiencies in both NRC's and Westinghouse's codes.

RELAP, which is the staff's code, we're

1 not planning to go back and fix. However, the face 2 code the staff is assessing against APEX AP1000, as well as ATLAS and UP --3 4 DR. WALLIS: How does fixing up the 5 staff's code accommodate deficiencies in Westinghouse's code? 6 7 MR. SEGALA: We're looking in the future for future uses of TRACE. In terms of Westinghouse's 8 code, they performed other analyses that showed that 9 they were okay during those time periods where no --10 11 DR. WALLIS: Yes, I know that. That's 12 part of the discussion in our letter, but it made quite an impression on the full committee. 13 The 14 NOTRUMP and its' one APEX series which didn't look 15 quite the same as the code predictions, and if this is the case, then it would seem that either now or down 16 the road there should be some awareness of this so 17 that when the code is used again, there's some effort 18 to figure out why it didn't work that last time and to 19 20 fix it because presumably it's a tool that's going to 21 be used again. 22 So it's not just up to you to fix your 23 code, but there ought to be some way in which the 24 vendor codes, which are sometimes very old,

actually fixed up when deficiencies are found like

this.

2	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, we didn't consider
3	this an issue with respect to AP1000 certification
4	because they bounded these things and worked around
5	them, but we just thought it wasn't a good idea to
6	have a code there that may have some things wrong with
7	it and needs fixing, and we recognize that NRC blesses
8	these codes for particular uses, and you can put
9	conditions on the use, but we just thought it would be
10	a good idea somehow to get those deficiencies fixed.
11	We're glad you're going to do it for TRACE. That
12	would help.
13	MR. SIEBER: But that really doesn't solve
14	the problem.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, the problem is in
16	case the code gets used for some other purpose, and
17	the staff has some constraints on these kind of
18	things.
19	MR. SEGALA: Yeah, when we write our
20	safety evaluations we make it very clear what it can
21	be used for.
22	MR. SIEBER: Well, as each individual
23	plant is licensed, at the operating license stage they
24	have to run that code for that plant, right? In order

to meet Appendix K?

1 And so if a code is deficient, then that means you've got to have these little bounding fix-up 2 3 segments in order to come up with a result. I guess 4 that's legitimate, but, on the other hand, it seems to 5 me to be a clumsy way to do it MR. COLACCINO: This is Joe Colaccino with 6 7 the staff. One of the things we asked Westinghouse to 8 do and what they did do was to identify what their 9 evaluation model was in their design control document. 10 11 So when these plants go into the future, they will 12 have to follow that evaluation model. The constraints do not just exist in our FSER, but it's actually in 13 14 the design control document. 15 So I guess with respect to AP1000 we feel like we're on solid ground in the evaluation of the 16 17 evaluation model. MR. SIEBER: Yeah, but you will still end 18 using the bounding calculations for certain 19 20 segments of the transient, which to me is perhaps 21 okay, but not very sophisticated. 22 MR. SEGALA: Yeah, and I think the 50.46, 23 when you look at it, it does not require that you have 24 one evaluation model or one code that fulfills that.

So in terms of meeting the regulations, those were the

1	criteria that we were faced with.
2	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
3	MR. SEGALA: The next issue was the range
4	of pi group values. In the interim letter you stated
5	that the staff should verify a pi group range of .5 to
6	two, as appropriate.
7	This range has been used as a de facto
8	standard in scaling analysis, and we believe this
9	issue is generic, not san issue specific only to
10	AP1000.
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: We heard from Steve
12	Bejoric (phonetic) that there were plans to actually
13	look at this.
14	MR. SEGALA: Yeah.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Is there a schedule for
16	that?
17	MR. SEGALA: Not that I'm aware of. We
18	don't have Steve here today, but we could I think
19	everything he told you the last time is pretty much
20	the same as it is today
21	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Once again, we view that
22	as kind of confirmatory type research. The assumption
23	is that the pi group range is okay, and based on,
24	well, thinking and intuition and looking at code
25	results and things that we'd like to see this as a

1 confirmatory thing for the staff to do. 2 DR. WALLIS: I think both this item and 3 the previous one point up some what you could call 4 them as generic issues that we have with these things. 5 CHAIRMAN KRESS: These are generic issues. DR. WALLIS: Yeah, they don't invalidate 6 7 the approval of AP1000, but they are some generic issues that have been raised as a result of what some 8 people call lessons learned from this review. 9 CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, this will call come 10 11 up in certification of the other type of design, and 12 we'd like to have a better technical basis for it. The issue is whether or not over those 13 14 ranges of pi groups, do you somehow change flow 15 regimes that some how causes a marked change in what you should have expected your code to predict or your 16 17 scaling to be. Well, I understand Steve has plans to look 18 19 at it or somebody has plans. 20 DR. WALLIS: It's more reassuring when you 21 have a pi group which may be .5 in one facility and 22 it's .2 in another facility, and you can say one is 23 somewhere in between. If it's bracketed in some way, 24 that perhaps is more reassurance than just if the pi

group is always under or over in all facilities.

1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Pardon? I didn't catch
2	that.
3	DR. WALLIS: I was saying that if you had
4	supposed you have two experimental facilities and
5	the pi group is .5 in one and two in the other, you
6	might tend to believe that one is somewhere in
7	between, but if you have two facilities and the pi
8	group is .5 and one is .55 in the other, that's not so
9	good. I'm just thinking how one might require this to
10	be handled in the future if one had doubts.
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, if you had two
12	separate facilities.
13	DR. WALLIS: Right.
14	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And were using those for
15	carrying it, and if you bracketed those
16	DR. WALLIS: Right. That might be more
17	reassuring.
18	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, that would be.
19	You're right. Okay.
20	DR. WALLIS: And I think that may be the
21	case for some of these.
22	CHAIRMAN KRESS: It could very well be.
23	DR. WALLIS: Right, right.
24	MR. SEGALA: Issue five, in-vessel
25	retention, fuel coolant interactions. Westinghouse

had a brief slide of that this morning. The interim letter said that the IVR assessment needs to consider the effects of exothermic intermetallic reactions.

We'd like to review the FCI models. The staff provides you a copy of contractor reports. I don't know if you have any comments on that.

CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, I haven't had a chance to digest those two reports, but I do have them, and it's -- the vessel flooding for AP1000 is almost a defense in depth thing. They don't need it to meet the goals, and it doesn't enter into the design basis space at all. It's just that it's like another generic type issue. We're going to be faced with the same thing for other reactor types, and I'd just like to know how the staff deals with those things.

It may be more important for some other reactors. I don't know, and so the idea of this thing was, number one, did we properly do a review and a defense in depth concept for the AP1000, and I think what I've looked at so far is the sensitivity studies that were done, and it looks like those properly ranged what I would say would be the possible variations in the melt mass to the super heat and a pretty good calculation of the resulting intergetics,

1 and even those things when you go to the extremes 2 didn't fail the containment. 3 So as far as I'm concerned it's a resolved 4 issue for AP1000, but I still want to know. 5 another one of these maybe lessons learned, generic issues, other certification designs. 6 7 And so I will review these two other 8 reports and see, but as far as I'm concerned, it's not 9 a problem now for AP1000. Issue six, organic 10 MR. SEGALA: Okay. 11 iodine production. The issue involved the inside of 12 containment. During an accident you have steaming and the water condenses on the wall, and the concern was 13 14 what is the pH of the film on the inside of the wall, 15 and you know, a simple statement: water film pH determines iodine behavior. pH less than seven leads 16 to production of elemental iodine, some of which is 17 converted into an organic iodine, and that's what 18 19 would get released outside of containment. 20 And sort of the opposite of that is to 21 prevent organic iodine production. The film pH should 22 be maintained above seven. 23 How do you do that? MR. SIEBER: 24 MR. SEGALA: Well, Westinghouse did some

calculations. The first calculation, they assumed the

1 amount of cesium hydroxide present for the DBA source 2 term, and they determined that the pH is maintained 3 above seven. To sort of look at the effects of 4 limited cesium hydroxide, they did a minimum 5 calculation where 270 grams of cesium hydroxide, about .1 percent of what's available is sufficient to keep 6 7 the pH above seven. And then they did a third evaluation where 8 9 what they called their sensitivity study. 10 assumed no cesium hydroxide present and then looked at 11 what were the effects of that, and the organic iodine 12 in containment increased from .15 percent to .33 percent, and they were able to show that with the 13 14 conservatisms in the dose calcs. that they still met the DBA dose criteria. 15 What is your definition of 16 DR. WALLIS: 17 organic iodine? Methyl iodine. 18 CHAIRMAN KRESS: 19 DR. WALLIS: Methyl, it's methyl iodine. 20 CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah. 21 After we met with you in MR. SEGALA: 22 June, on June 3rd, I believe, the staff audited 23 Westinghouse's calculations Westinghouse's in 24 Rockville office, and the staff found these

calculations to be acceptable, and we agree with their

1	conclusions.
2	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Dana's problem was the
3	nitrogen in the atmosphere would tend to take the film
4	acid, and apparently the calculation for that is the
5	absorption of nitrogen into the liquid and then
6	conversion to the nitric acid, whereas he says, no,
7	that's not the way to do it, that it gets converted in
8	the gas phase and then gets absorbed.
9	Was anything to address that done?
10	MR. SEGALA: Yeah, I believe our
11	contractor Andre, do you have any?
12	MR. DROZO: This is Andre Drozo, and I'm
13	representing Kris Parczewski who was doing the actual
14	calculations.
15	He concluded and we all concluded that
16	indeed the acid is produced in the liquid film.
17	CHAIRMAN KRESS: In the liquid?
18	MD. DROZO: In the liquid, yes.
19	That he went through available literature
20	in at least one Oregon (phonetic) and Oak Ridge test,
21	and that they had a liquid and a gas flowing
22	simultaneously, and they determined that 99.99 percent
23	of acid is being produced in the liquid film.
24	CHAIRMAN KRESS: So Westinghouse's
25	calculation as opposed

1	MR. ROSEN: Are you saying Dana is wrong?
2	CHAIRMAN KRESS: I don't know.
3	MR. ROSEN: It will be the first known
4	instance of it.
5	CHAIRMAN KRESS: The first time.
6	DR. WALLIS: That's a very slow reaction
7	to dissolution of nitrogen to form
8	MR. DROZO: Methyl comes from
9	DR. WALLIS: Well, I'm sorry. You're
10	answering a different question.
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, the idea is the
12	nitrogen makes it acidic.
13	DR. WALLIS: Yeah, but it's a very slow
14	reaction, absorption of nitrogen to make an acid.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, if you're absorbing
16	it, if you're absorbing it. That's not what Dana says
17	happened.
18	MR. ROSEN: Yeah, Dana said
19	DR. WALLIS: Yeah, but he's saying Dana is
20	wrong, I think.
21	MR. ROSEN: Yeah, and Dana was saying that
22	the formation is of nitrous oxide in the air.
23	DR. WALLIS: Well, if that's there, then
24	I can see it being absorbed.
25	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, it absorbs rapidly.
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1	DR. WALLIS: But I can't see nitrogen
2	itself being absorbed rapidly.
3	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And that's the point.
4	Which is it? Is it nitrous oxide in the air going in
5	or is it
6	DR. WALLIS: And what makes that?
7	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Radiation fuel.
8	DR. WALLIS: Radiation fuel.
9	MR. DROZO: And I would never say Dr.
10	Powers is wrong. I would never say that.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. SIEBER: He's not here.
13	CHAIRMAN KRESS: He'll be here for the
14	full meeting in July. We may have this on the agenda
15	because I think it is probably the one lingering ACRS
16	item that you know, once again it's almost a "no
17	never mind" because it doesn't enter design basis
18	space hardly and because you've got a specified source
19	term in there, and severe accidents are such low
20	frequency that who cares almost.
21	So in my mind it doesn't raise itself to
22	an issue, but it's a kind of a lingering thing that's
23	on Dana's mind, and so it's something we want to get
24	off the table. So keep in mind that this might be one

of the things that you want to look at again.

1	And, in particular, this calculation that
2	Andre is talking about would be well worth bringing
3	forward for the meeting.
4	MR. SCHULZ: This is Terry Schulz.
5	Let me just say one little thing here.
6	The sensitivity study that we redid there doesn't
7	depend on what's going on with the nitrogen and nitric
8	acid at all. That only comes in
9	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Do you want to let that
10	be acid anyway?
11	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay. Well, that's
13	another. That's well worth bringing out. That
14	doesn't matter.
15	MR. SCHULZ: Right. This issue of how
16	much nitric acid there is and how quickly it's formed
17	comes into play in the first tube.
18	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Because you want to add
19	Lead B acid.
20	MR. SCHULZ: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Then Dana is going to ask
22	what were your sources of the organic/inorganic.
23	MR. SCHULZ: There are still questions,
24	yes.
25	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah. But anyway, that

	130
1	is a good point.
2	MR. ROSEN: Remind me if you will of where
3	this half a pound of cesium hydroxide comes from.
4	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Right out of the fuel.
5	MR. ROSEN: That much
6	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Oh, there's more than
7	that.
8	MR. DROZO: Potentially in the core.
9	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Fission products. It
10	might release ten, 30 percent of it.
11	MR. DROZO: That's correct.
12	MR. ROSEN: Well, where does the methyl
13	group come from?
14	MR. DROZO: Well, that's already there.
15	MR. SIEBER: You need to use the
16	microphone.
17	MR. ROSEN: In the fuel?
18	MR. DROZO: Methyl comes from reaction of
19	elemental iodine and the insulation materials in the
20	containment.
21	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, it's insulation
22	materials that gives you the
23	DR. RANSOM: With stainless steel?
24	MR. DROZO: No, no. With not rubber but
25	this plastic electrical insulation.

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1	MR. SIEBER: Cabling.
2	MR. DROZO: Cabling, yes.
3	MR. SIEBER: Yes, wire insulation.
4	MR. DROZO: Wires.
5	DR. RANSOM: It's hydrocarbon material.
6	MR. DROZO: Right.
7	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And you can make some
8	methane in the core if you've got the right chemistry.
9	You've got the hydrogen there, and you've got the
10	carbon. You've got the materials. You could make
11	some, and there has been some chemical equilibrium
12	calculations that says there's a certain level of it.
13	You know, it's not a lot, but you can make
14	it.
15	But, anyway, this is one that Dana will be
16	interested in hearing in July
17	MR. SEGALA: Issue seven, which is the
18	last issue, catastrophic failure of steel containment,
19	the concern was a free standing steel containment can
20	fail in a catastrophic manner. When its failure
21	pressure is exceeded, this could lead to a rapid
22	depressurization and resuspension of the deposited
23	fission products.
24	The staff determination of the frequency
25	of the catastrophic containment failures were small

1	and resuspension would not have a noticeable impact on
2	the commission's safety goals.
3	DR. WALLIS: You mean on meeting the
4	safety goals.
5	MR. SEGALA: Yes.
6	DR. WALLIS: It's not going to change the
7	goals.
8	MR. SEGALA: yeah.
9	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Although sometimes I wish
10	they would.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. SEGALA: So this is in summary open
13	items are resolved from our perspective, although we
14	need to talk to you about one of them. All ACRS
15	issues are addressed, and it looks like you still want
16	to talk about the organic iodine.
17	CHAIRMAN KRESS: I don't see that as a
18	show stopper, but
19	MR. SEGALA: Okay.
20	DR. WALLIS: You might get questions from
21	Dana.
22	CHAIRMAN KRESS: You certainly will.
23	MR. SEGALA: He'll be there at the next
24	fully committee?
25	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah.

1	PARTICIPANT: July 7th.
2	MR. SEGALA: NRC staff is still on
3	schedule to issue the FSER.
4	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay. Thank you very
5	much.
6	I think we're nearing the end here. This
7	is the time for item number six, and I think we don't
8	need a break yet.
9	Item number six is a summary statement
10	from either Westinghouse, the staff or both. Does
11	Westinghouse wish to make some summary remarks?
12	MR. VIJUK: Not really. I think we
13	believe we've satisfied what the staff has asked for,
14	and we hope we're getting close to satisfying you.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: I presume the staff will
16	make any summary remarks or do they?
17	MR. SEGALA: No, not at this time.
18	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Okay. I think what we
19	need to do now before we well, there is an item on
20	here for public feedback, and I don't see anybody
21	there. So we'll forget that one.
22	We need to decide on what to do at the
23	full committee meeting in July. Does Westinghouse
24	
	come to that, I presume?

1 CHAIRMAN KRESS: We have two hours. Му 2 proposal is to give Westinghouse 45 minutes and the 3 staff 45 minutes. 4 DR. WALLIS: Well, I suggest that 5 Westinghouse concentrate on why they meet the regulations and no so much a description of what a 6 7 wonderful machine it is. CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, I would suppose you 8 9 skip the design review. I think we're up on that, and 10 you know, stick on your approach to safety. I think 11 you can skip the Squib valve stuff, too, now and maybe 12 include the PCC and the safety margin slides and maybe the summary of the severe accidents and the CDF and 13 14 LRF, and that way you can condense this to maybe 45 15 minutes. That's fine. 16 MR. VIJUK: 17 CHAIRMAN KRESS: And the staff, I think you almost have a 45 minute talk with what you have, 18 19 and I would just sort of repeat that, but remember you 20 may have to spend more time on the organic and add 21 that in. And I think we also would look forward to 22 23 hearing about the exact wording of the COL action item 24 on the screen blockage. What does it actually say?

You might want to bring that with you.

1	And I think that that would wrap it up for
2	us.
3	DR. WALLIS: I think it's miraculous, Mr.
4	Chairman, how the staff has managed to summarize this
5	one foot high stack of paper over here in a short
6	time.
7	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah. I wonder if I
8	could bill the staff for my eye doctor's appointment,
9	trying to read that off of my PC.
10	(Laughter.)
11	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Would that be billable to
12	Westinghouse?
13	(Laughter.)
14	MR. CUMMINS: Everything seems to be
15	billable to Westinghouse.
16	(Laughter.)
17	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, with that, are
18	there any further comments from the subcommittee
19	members?
20	MR. ROSEN: Yeah. I don't think you've
21	characterized or I don't understand the
22	characterization of the sump issue as to summarize the
23	COL action item. I think the issue is that we've come
24	upon a current item, current regulatory issue item,
25	and the question is do we and we're about to

1 certify this design or recommend certification of this 2 design, and the question is how does in regulatory 3 space one handle that subject. 4 Do you include it as a post certification 5 item, a COL action item, or do you say, no, we need to have a resolution or a commitment to resolution in the 6 7 current licensing basis for this plant? My feeling is it's the latter, that this 8 is not a backfit for this plant. This plant is now 9 being licensed. 10 11 So you know, to say it's going to be a 12 compliance backfit later like it is for the operating plants, that's because those plants are already 13 14 licensed. That's why we're treating it that way. 15 This plant is not licensed. Yeah, but it's being 16 CHAIRMAN KRESS: 17 licensed to just about the same rules. MR. ROSEN: Well, the rules are Req. Guide 18 19 1.82. That's with that 50 percent blockage 20 assumption, which we know is incorrect. 21 CHAIRMAN KRESS: But the rule has 22 associated with it guidance, and that guidance has 23 been followed by the plants and will be followed by 24 Westinghouse, and the idea is that that quidance is

going to change, but it hasn't yet.

1	And so you're stuck in a time warp there,
2	but maybe the staff could be prepared to elaborate a
3	little bit on how that issue is being treated.
4	MR. COLACCINO: Yeah, this is Joe
5	Colaccino.
6	And as we said, just after the morning
7	session the staff will give you in the July 7 meeting
8	a complete discussion of it and not just a little
9	discussion of the COL item.
10	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Yeah, that would be a
11	good thing to put on there, too.
12	MR. COLACCINO: And we plan to make it a
13	significant part of our presentation to the full
14	committee.
15	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Good. Thank you.
16	I think that might be well worthwhile.
17	Anybody else?
18	(No response.)
19	CHAIRMAN KRESS: Well, seeing none, I want
20	to thank all of the speakers, the staff and
21	Westinghouse, and I must say I think our interactions
22	on this have been, over the period of time, it has
23	been very good, and so, you know, I thank you for
24	that.
25	MR. VIJUK: We feel the same. Thank you.

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1	CHAIRMAN KRESS: And we look forward to
2	seeing you in July.
3	With that I'm going to declare this
4	meeting adjourned.
5	(Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the meeting was
6	adjourned.)
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